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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the participation of the Hellenic military forces in 
Peacekeeping operations in the Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. 
This Dissertation is structured in 4 chapters. The 1st chapter provides some 
important information concerning the peacekeeping doctrine; it is also referred 
to some basic principles as well as the procedures and the policy that regulate 
the UN PKOs. In addition, it explains the decision process that precedes the 
deployment of a peacekeeping operation and in the end it introduces the 
concept and evolution of use of Force. In order to understand the 
development of UN peacekeeping, a historical overview is outlined in Chapter 
2 which provides an inside look into how the applicable norms became 
principles of peacekeeping. Apart from the United Nations, the African Union, 
the European Union and the NATO conduct peacekeeping operations not only 
by themselves but also in close cooperation among them; this is described 
extensively in Chapter 3. The 4th and last chapter discusses the Greek 
participation in peacekeeping operations and particularly is referred to the 
ongoing activities that Greece is participating in as well as the concluded 
activities that the country participated in the past.  
Key words: UN Peacekeeping operations, mandate, mission, Greek 
participation 
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Introduction 
It has been claimed by many historians that the birth of peacekeeping comes 
from the Delian League of ancient Greece in the fifth century, BCE. But, like 
the Delian League, on closer investigation these paradigms of “proto” 
peacekeeping were common alliances that had little to do with ethical 
questions surrounding peace. From a western view, the closest paradigm 
from history that is similar of what we refer today as peacekeeping begun in 
the late tenth century by the early medieval Catholic Church through its 
attempts (the Peace of God and Truce of God) to limit the spread of war. 
Nevertheless, these ideals and some early efforts at arms control (i.e., the 
Second Lateran Council of 1139) also started to allow the fury of interstate 
war in Europe to be directed at the Muslim-dominated Middle East. 
In 1623, Emeric Crucé introduced an innovating and radical idea .He stated 
that: “all the worlds’ leaders, including all those outside of traditional Europe, 
should be included in an alliance that tried to resolve international disputes 
through mediation at a world council held in a neutral location”. Over the next 
few centuries, more essential European efforts were made to peace-
orientated agreements included the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Utrecht in 
1713, Paris in 1763 and in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars the Concert of 
Europe in 1815-18. There were some other efforts, but the first important 
system came into being after the atrocities of World War I (1914-18). The 
League of Nations was an initiative of American President Woodrow Wilson, 
and it was an effort at collective diplomacy and peace enforcement. However, 
It completely failed, but after the Second World War, the United Nations 
Organization (UNO) constituted the means of collective diplomacy and 
peace.1 
On 24 October 1945, the United Nations (UN) was created as a consequence 
of two World Wars and was intended, in the enduring words of the UN 
Charter, to saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Since its 
establishment, the UN has been called upon to prevent conflicts from 
developing into war, to convince opposing parties to use the conference table 
rather than armed forces and to contribute in restoring peace when disputes 
breaks out. Over the decades, the UN has contributed to terminate plenty of 
conflicts, in many cases through the conduct of peacekeeping missions.2 
The geographical concentration of UN PKOs changes over time, depending 
on the location where a dispute breaks out. During the post–cold war era, 
there have been large- and small-scale non-UN PKOs led by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the African 
Union (AU) and individual countries. Noteworthy, some non-UN PKOs include 
                                                          
1 Sunil Ram (2008),  The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 
1945 to 1987,  Peace Operations Training Institute, USA 
2Department of Peacekeeping Operations  (2003), Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations, New York, USA 
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the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 
the Multinational Force—Iraq, US-led Operation Northern Watch in Iraq, the 
European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine, the European Union 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia, (EUMM) and the AU missions in Darfur, 
Somalia and Burundi.3 
Greece as a full member of EU, UN, NATO and other International 
Organizations, takes part in peacekeeping operations, emphasizing mainly on 
those taking place in areas of particular interest, like the Balkans and the 
wider region of the Middle East. Since early 80s Greek’s involvement has 
been restricted to a small number of observers and small military forces, at 
company level, with some rare exceptions, e.g. Korean War.4 
In the framework of the U.N. actions and the Security Council Resolutions, 
Greece is an active contributor in peacekeeping operations, distributing 
cadres from the three Services of the Armed Forces. The Greek participation 
in peacekeeping operation is subject to specific important conditions, like the 
existence of a Resolution or a Mandate of the U.N., before deploying a unit, 
chain of command and size, as well the adoption of clear Rules of 
Engagement. Peacekeeping missions that the Greek Armed Forces has 
participated in the last decade of the 20th Century and early 21st Century, 
indicate that military organization can adapt easily and adequately to any 
challenge and requirement within the International Community.5 
Chapter 1: the normative framework for United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations 
1.1 The Charter of the United Nations 
In San Francisco, on 26 June 1945, was signed the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN) which constitutes the most important document for the entire 
United Nations’ work. The United Nations was created in order to “save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and one of its fundamental 
objectives is to preserve peace and security globally. Despite the fact that 
peacekeeping, is not directly provided for in the Charter; however it has 
developed into one of the most essential instruments used by the United 
Nations with the purpose to reach its goals.   
 The United Nations Security Council, under the Charter, has the vital 
obligation to secure the international peace and security.6  The Security 
                                                          
3Todd Sandler (2017),  International Peacekeeping Operations, Burden Sharing and Effectiveness, 
Department of Economics, University of Texas, USA 
4 The Greek Expeditionary Force (GEF) in Korea comprised a reinforced Hellenic Army infantry battalion 
and a Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) flight of seven transport planes. Greece was the fifth largest troop 
contributor to U.N. Forces in Korea. 
5 Hellenic National Defense General Staff,  Peace Support Activities 
6 Although the United Nations Charter gives primary responsibility to the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 
1950, also known as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, states that: “...if the Security Council, because 
of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to 
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Council, in order to fulfill this responsibility, may be adapted to a spectrum of 
actions, containing the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. 
The legal framework for this specific activity exists in Chapters VI, VII and VIII 
of the Charter. Although Chapter VI has to do with the “Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes”, Chapter VII concludes provisions which have connection with 
“Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of 
Aggression”. In addition, Chapter VIII of the Charter is referred to the 
engagement of regional arrangements and organizations in the maintenance 
of peace and security internationally, so providing such actions are compatible 
with the aims and principles defined in Chapter I of the Charter.   
The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations have generally been 
related with Chapter VI of the Charter. Nevertheless, the Security Council is 
not be required to refer to a particular Chapter of the Charter when passing a 
resolution empowering the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation and has never called upon Chapter VI. In current years, the Security 
Council has embraced the procedure of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter 
when authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations 
into inconstant post-conflict settings where the State is inadequate to preserve 
security and public order. The Security Council’s invocation of Chapter VII in 
such circumstances denoting also the legal basis for its activity can also be 
recognized as an assertion of firm political resolve and a way of reminding the 
parties to a combat and the wider United Nations participation of their 
responsibility to give effect to Security Council resolutions.   
 Associating United Nations peacekeeping with a specific Chapter of the 
Charter can be deceptive for the objectives of operational planning, training 
and mandate implementation. Evaluating the essence of each peacekeeping 
operation and the capacities required to reinforce it, troop contributing 
countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries (PCCs) should be led by 
the duties authorized by the Security Council mandate, the idea of operations 
and accompanying mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) as regards the 
military sector, and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) concerning the 
police component.   
1.2 Organs of the United Nations Body 
Security Council  
The Security Council is constituted of five constant members (France, the 
Russian Federation, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 
ten non-permanent members. Half of the non-permanent countries are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective 
measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”  General Assembly 
resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 authorizing the establishment of the First United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF I) was adopted under procedure established by the “Uniting for Peace” 
resolution 
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elected each year by the General Assembly for a time period of two years. 
The UN Charter provides an important jurisdiction on the Security Council to 
check into thoroughly any case or dispute that undermines international peace 
and security. Therefore, the Security Council is the dominant organization 
worldwide which is related with international peace and security and, by that, 
has legitimacy under international law for the use of force or intervention 
against a sovereign nation. Under Chapter VIII of the Charter, it can transfer 
this obligation to regional organizations, for instance the African Union (AU).7 
The General Assembly  
The General Assembly deals with any issue related to it by the Security 
Council. In addition, the General Assembly is referred to matters concerning 
to the promotion of international cooperation, disarmament, trusteeship, and 
human rights. Although most of its resolutions are not mandatory, General 
Assembly is the organ that approves and divides into shares the UN's annual 
budget, containing all costs related to Peacekeeping Operations.8  
The UN Secretariat  
The UN Secretariat is the permanent instrument responsible for the wide 
ranging of United Nations activities. Its supervisor is the Secretary-General9, 
and in essence constitutes the UN's civil service branch. Although this 
organization has many departments, the major departments that concerns 
PKOs are the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); the 
Department of Field Support (DFS); and the Department of Safety and 
Security (DSS).  The Under-Secretaries-general of these departments, with 
their specialist advisers – such as the Military Adviser or Police Adviser – are 
responsible for providing advice and guidance to the SG and the Security 
Council on peacekeeping operations and their associated disciplines, as well 
as for providing executive authority for their conduct and support when so 
delegated.10 
Economic and Social Council 
The Economic and Social Council constitutes the main body for coordination, 
policy dialogue, policy review and recommendations on economic, social and 
environmental questions, along with the implementation of globally agreed 
development objectives. It works as the key mechanism for actions of the UN 
policy and its specialized agencies in the economic, social and environmental 
fields, supervising subsidiary and expert bodies.  It consists of 54 Members, 
                                                          
7 http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/ 
8 http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/ 
9 The Secretary-General of the UN, under the supervision of the Security Council, is in charge for the 
organization, the conduct, and the overseeing of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. Apart 
from the preparation of the operational plan and presentation of it to the Security Council for 
approval, the Secretary-General is responsible for carrying out negotiations with the host countries, 
the parties in dispute, and the Member States contributing troops and resources. 
10 http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/ 
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elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. It is the 
United Nations’ central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking 
on sustainable development.11 
Trusteeship Council 
The Trusteeship Council was created in 1945 by the UN Charter, 
under Chapter XIII, to secure international surveillance for 11 Trust Territories 
that had been established under the supervision of seven Member States, 
and guarantee that sufficient measures were taken in order to prepare the 
Territories for self-government and independence. By 1994, all Trust 
Territories had attained self-government or independence. On 1 November 
1994, the Trusteeship Council postponed operation. On 25 May 1994,  by a 
resolution adopted the Council modified its rules of procedure to drop the 
obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as circumstances required -- 
by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority 
of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council.12 
International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice is the main judicial organ of the United 
Nations. It is situated at the Peace Palace in Hague (Netherlands). It is the 
only one of the six principal organs of the United Nations not located in New 
York (United States of America). The Court’s mission is to settle, in 
association with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and 
to provide advisory opinions on legal questions related to it by authorized 
United Nations organs and specialized agencies.13 
Military Staff Committee  
The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is the United Nations Security 
Council subsidiary body whose role, as defined by the United Nations Charter, 
is to plan UN military operations14 and assist in the regulation of armaments.15 
Article 47 of the UN Charter entails the creation of a Military Staff Committee. 
The Committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of 
the Security Council, who operate by offering recommendations and assisting 
on all issues regarding to the Security Council's military necessities for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Although this task is 
mentioned in the UN Charter, in essence, the Military Staff Committee has not 
played the role envisaged by the Charter and has exerted very little influence 
on UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs).16    
 
 
                                                          
11 http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/ 
12 http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/ 
13 http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/ 
14  Charter Of The United Nations: Chapter VII Archived2014-08-25 at the Wayback Machine. 
15  Charter Of The United Nations: Chapter V Archived 2013-10-01 at the Wayback Machine. 
16 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Staff_Committee 
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1.3 The Spectrum of Peace and Security Activities 
Peacekeeping constitutes a part among a range of activities undertaken by 
the United Nations and other international actors in order to maintain 
international peace and security in all over the world. Even though 
peacekeeping is the main tool of this document, however it is essential for 
practitioners to realize how it relates to and differs from conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace building. 
Conflict prevention contains the application of structural or diplomatic 
methods to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and contradictions from 
developed into violent conflict. Ideally, it should establish on structured early 
warning, information gathering and a accurate analysis of the reasons leading 
to the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may contain the use of the 
Secretary General’s “good offices,” preventive deployment or confidence-
building measures.  
Peacemaking in most cases consists of measures to address conflicts in 
progress and generally contains diplomatic act to bring opposed parties to a 
negotiated compromise. The United Nations Secretary-General, upon the 
request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his or her own 
initiative, may exercise his or her “good offices” to assist the progress of the 
resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be groups of states, envoys, 
regional organizations, governments, or the United Nations. Peacemaking 
actions may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, 
or by a prominent personality working independently. 
Peacekeeping is a method created to maintain the peace, however 
breakable, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in establishing 
agreements accomplished by the peacemakers. Over the years, 
peacekeeping has developed from a mainly military type of watching cease-
fires and the disengagement of forces after inter-state wars, to embody a 
complicated model of many components – military, police and civilian – 
working together to help lay the foundations for continuous peace. 
 Peace enforcement contains the application, with the supervision of the 
Security Council, of a range of forcible measures, involving the use of military 
force. Actions like these aim to rebuild international peace and security in 
occasions where the Security Council has addressed the presence of a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council 
may make use of, where it is suitable, agencies and regional organizations for 
enforcement action under its authority. 
 Peacebuilding contains a variety of actions aimed to decrease the danger of 
lapsing or relapsing into conflict by making more powerful national capabilities 
at all levels for conflict management, and to pave the way for continual peace 
and improvement. Peacebuilding is a complicated, long-term procedure of 
establishing the needed circumstances for sustainable peace. It works by 
focusing to the deep-rooted, structural causes of fierce conflict in a 
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comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding actions target in crucial questions that 
affect the functioning of society and the State, and look for enhancing the 
capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core 
functions.17  
1.4 Basic principles of UN peacekeeping operations  
Even though the operation of United Nations peacekeeping has developed 
significantly and with an extremely fast pace over the past sixty years, three 
fundamental principles have traditionally remained and continue to set United 
Nations peacekeeping operations apart as an instrument for maintaining 
international peace and security: 
1. Consent of the parties 
2. Impartiality 
3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate 
These principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. It is substantial to 
mention that their meaning and relationship to each other are without no 
doubt understood by all actors engaged in the planning and function of United 
Nations peacekeeping operations, in the way that they are applied effectively. 
Taking in to account that these principles are inter-related, they provide a 
navigation aid, or compass, for practitioners both in the field and at United 
Nations Headquarters. 
1. Consent of the parties 
The deployment of the UN peacekeeping operations is carried out with the 
consent of the basic parties to the conflict.18 For that reason the commitment 
by the parties to a political process is essential. Their approval of a 
peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the appropriate freedom of 
activity, political and physical at the same time, in order to conduct its 
mandated obligations. 
In case of such consent is absent, then a peacekeeping operation is in danger 
to become a part of the conflict; and be drawn towards enforcement action, 
and far away from its crucial role of sustaining the peace. 
The matter that the principal parties have given their consent to the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation to deploy does not necessarily mean or 
secure that there will also be consent at regional level, specifically if the 
                                                          
17 Harvey J. Langholtz, (2010), Ph.D.: Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping 
Operations, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, p.17-18  
Peace Operations Training Institute, USA  
18  The Security Council may take enforcement action without the consent of the main parties to the 
conflict, if it believes that the conflict presents a threat to international peace and security. This, 
however, would be a peace enforcement operation. It may also take enforcement action for 
humanitarian or protection purposes; where there is no political process and where the consent of 
the major parties may not be achievable, but where civilians are suffering. Since the mid-1990s, 
enforcement action has been carried out by ad hoc coalitions of Member States or regional 
organizations acting under United Nations Security Council authorization. 
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predominant parties are internally divided or have weak administrative and 
control systems.  Universality of consent becomes even less feasible in 
volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the 
supervision of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.19 
2. Impartiality 
Impartiality is imperative to keep the consent and cooperation of the main 
parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations 
peacekeepers should be characterized by impartiality while dealing with the 
parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the conduction of their mandate. 
Just like a respectable referee is impartial, but will punish offences, with the 
same way a peacekeeping operation should not forgive actions by the parties 
that violate the undertakings of the peace procedures or the international rules 
and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation supports. 
Despite the necessity to create and keep favorable relations with the parties, 
a peacekeeping operation must carefully stay away from actions that may 
undermine its role of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a 
rigorous application of the idea of impartiality for risk of misinterpretation or 
retaliation. 
Unable to do so may erode the peacekeeping operation’s integrity and 
legitimacy, and may drive to a removal of consent for its presence by one or 
more of the parties. 
3. Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate 
UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. Nevertheless, they 
may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security 
Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate. 
In specific hostile circumstances, the Security Council has given UN 
peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates allowing them to “use all 
necessary means” to prevent violent actions aiming to disorganize the political 
process, secure civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or help 
the national governments  in maintaining law and order. 
As envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, robust 
peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, even though 
on the ground they may sometimes seem similar. 
• “Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the 
authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or 
the main parties to the conflict.” ( Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D, 2010) 
• By contrast, “peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main 
parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or 
international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under 
Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.”          
( Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D, 2010) 
                                                          
19 Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and 
interests, and will therefore work to undermine it. 
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 UN peacekeeping operations should only use force as a tool of last resort. It 
should always be measured in an accurate, suitable and appropriate way, in 
the framework of the principle of the minimum force needed to accomplish the 
desired result, while maintaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The 
use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political impact and 
sometimes can give rise to unexpected circumstances. 
Judgments with the regard to its use is necessary to be made at the suitable 
level within a mission, based on a mixture of factors containing public 
perceptions; mission capacity;  force protection; humanitarian impact;  safety 
and security of personnel; and, most substantially, the effect that such action 
will have on national and local consent for the mission.20 
1.5 Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping 
1.5.1 The Legal Framework 
 UN peacekeeping – regardless the level of force an operation is required to 
use – is not mentioned in the UN Charter. The drafters of the Charter did, 
nevertheless, provide a crucial role for the Security Council in authorizing the 
use of force where international peace and security had been risked or 
threatened. The rules and principles envisaged on the use of force in the UN 
Charter are straightforward:  
1. No state may threaten or use force against another state;21  
2.  Where the Security Council finds that a state has threatened or 
breached international peace and security or engaged in an act of 
aggression,22 it may take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
including, where necessary, the authorization of the use of armed 
force;23 
3.  States may take measures in self-defense until the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security;24 
4.  Decisions taken by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII are 
binding on all member states.25  
The model is clear, even though it has crucial disadvantage: it provides a 
Security Council with a permanent force at its disposal, which it may call upon 
to enforce its will. For the reason that such a force has never been enacted, 
when it came to the use of force, self-defense under Article 51 was practically 
the only choice –during the Cold War, at least. In 1950, although there was, 
an authorization for the use of force against North Korea to be conducted by a 
US-led coalition of the willing (as an alternative to the nonexistent standing 
                                                          
20https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping  
21 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
22 Article 39 of the UN Charter 
23 Article 42 of the UN Charter 
24 Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
25 Article 24(1) and 48(1) of the UN Charter. 
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force), this was the only such authorization during the Cold War. The politics 
of the Cold War made it unlikely that the authorization of force would be 
judged to be in the common interests of all of the veto-wielding permanent 
members of the Security Council.26 
Even though peacekeeping was not referred to in the Charter, there were 
some efforts to fit it in the framework of the Charter. While it was not 
envisaged as being powerful in nature and because it was only to take place 
on the consent of the states affected, it was not necessary for the Security 
Council to rely on its Chapter VII powers which, allow it to authorize the use of 
force and to obligate member states without their consent. After all, the fact 
that peacekeeping operations were usually armed and generally constituted of 
thousands of military personnel indicated that they did not fit accurately into 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This fact drove to some mentioning to the legal 
basis for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation as being ‘Chapter VI 
1/2’ of the Charter. However, as peacekeeping has developed any division 
between Chapter VII ‘enforcement’ and Chapter VI 1/2 ‘peacekeeping’ has 
become very murky indeed. 
1.5.2 Phases of the Use of Force 
Phase 1: Peace Observation Missions  
For some people, the peace observation missions that firstly be seen with the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in the late 
1940s, are not necessarily be  acknowledged as peacekeeping at all; in the 
contrary, they recognize these operations as predecessors to peacekeeping. 
Although these observations missions are substantially dissimilar from the 
character of peacekeeping operations which initiated with UNEF I in 1956, it is 
crucial to include this category of operations to the concept of peacekeeping. 
However, their actions overlap with those of other peacekeeping missions; 
furthermore the operations are considered as peacekeeping by the UN and 
many scholars. 
Phase 2: UNEF I  
With the creation of the first United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez 
(UNEF I) by the General Assembly, the type of UN peacekeeping was 
changed. The operation was given a mandate that was more thorough in 
nature and envisaged a significantly larger number of troops than the 
observation-focused operations that had existed before it. At its maximum 
strength, UNEF I had 6,073 military personnel, boosted by international and 
local civilian staff. With the rise in size and actions of the operation it had the 
ability to importantly influence the situation in the field. Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld acknowledged that UNEF I had a totally different character 
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from observer forces which previously were established by the UN. He 
defined it as ‘paramilitary in character and much more than an observers’ 
corps’. 27 Apart from this, he underlined that it was to be ‘in no way a military 
force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed’. 28 
Phase 3: ‘Defense of Mandate’ Operations  
Hammarskjöld’s accurate approach to the use of force by peacekeeping 
operations was moved away from almost rapidly, and the second phase 
featured a single operation: UNEF I. Although it is reasonable that the 
following peacekeeping operations were taken place by the Security Council, 
it is meaningful to indicate that the Security Council was not, at this level, 
invoking its Chapter VII powers in conducting operations. For that reason, 
Hammarskjöld’s principles of use of force only in self-defense, consent of the 
host state and impartiality, established in the context of the UNEF I operation, 
were extremely influential to subsequent peacekeeping practice. 
Phase 4: Non-Forceful Peacekeeping Operations which Become 
Forceful when Confronted with Crisis (Mission Creep) 
 Just before the publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 – a document that is 
referred to the fifth phase, mentioned below – the authorization of offensive 
force in UN peacekeeping was limited and constituted a means of a 
desperate, last resort for the Security Council when trying to save a failing 
peacekeeping operation opposed to a deteriorating condition on the ground. 
Operations included to this category referred to the UN peacekeeping 
operation created in the Congo in 1960 (ONUC), the UN operations in 
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia established in 1992 and the UN 
operations in East Timor established in 1999. In each case, a peacekeeping 
operation was established with an authorization to use force rarely and, in 
each case, peacekeepers were authorized to use offensive force by a rattled 
Security Council when violence on the ground compromised the original 
operation. 
Phase 5: The Brahimi Report and the Invocation of Chapter VII from the 
Outset  
 Secretary-General Annan decided to assemble a high-level Panel to 
undertake a comprehensive review of the UN’s peace and security actions, in 
March 2000. This led to a broad ranging report on peacekeeping, the so 
called the Brahimi Report after its Chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi. The Report, 
transmitted in August 2000, has been remarkably influential concerning the 
use of force by peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report indicated that 
                                                          
27 United Nations, ‘Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for an Emergency 
International United Nations Force Requested in Resolution 998 (ES-I), Adopted by the General 
Assembly on 4 Nov. 1956’ (UN doc A/3302), 6 Nov. 1956, para. 12. See also the Secretary-General’s 
1958 Summary Study, para. 15. 
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peacekeeping must be reinvented in a way that it is authorized to guarantee 
security and protect civilians.29 
Chapter 2: Historical Evolution of PKOs 
2.1 UN Peacekeeping: The beginning (1947-1956) 
 The three peacekeeping missions which were took place during the period 
from 1947 to 1956 were the reason for starting a series of actions through 
which peacekeeping constituted an indispensable element for the UN. Their 
main objective was to investigate, monitor, observe, establish facts and report 
their findings. The first mission was UNSCOB, established in 1947 to oversee 
and investigate allegations came from Greece concerning the support 
provided by Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia to communist guerrillas in 
Greece, who aimed to overthrow the established government. UNSCOB 
followed by the UNTSO, which was established in 1948 in order to monitor 
cease-fire lines between Israel and its neighbors. UNMOGIP which was set 
up in 1949 to monitor and observe the situation along cease-fire lines within 
Kashmir over which India and Pakistan had engaged into a conflict  during the 
period from 1947 to 1949. 
2.1.1 United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (1947-1951)  
With resolution 109 (II) on 21 October 1947, the General Assembly 
established the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans 
(UNSCOB). Nine of the eleven members of the Security Council, including the 
Netherlands, each provided two delegates for UNSCOB. The Soviet Union 
and Poland declined to participate. The four nations involved were required by 
the resolution to seek a peaceful resolution to their differences.30  
There has been a serious debate over United Nations Special Commission on 
the Balkans (UNSCOB) on whether it is considered as a peacekeeping 
operation. A thorough analysis of UNSCOB demonstrates that there was 
never existed any crucial evidence showing the cooperation from the 
communist states neighboring northern Greece. Nevertheless, UNSCOB is 
considered as a part of UN peacekeeping and it is the first time that used an 
observation group consisted of by impartial military personnel. For that reason 
this mission constituted the basis for the following peacekeeping operations. 
 Germany occupied Greece during World War II and that led to the 
establishment of an underground resistance movement, the so called National 
Liberation Front, commonly known by its acronym EAM. Although EAM and 
its military wing ELAS (the national People’s Liberation Army) operated under 
the supervision of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), however there were 
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many non-communists in its rank.31 Disagreements between communists and 
non-communists increases and a civil war broke out in the country. While the 
civil war expanding north, the communist guerrillas started receiving military 
support from the newly created communist states of Albania, Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia. Disputes grew resulting in UN intervention.32 The Greek civil war 
highlighted the emerging conflicts between the West and the Soviet bloc 
which drove the deadlock of the Security Council. The persistence by the 
Soviet Union to use veto led to the issue being removed from the Security 
Council to the General Assembly, which later instructed UNSCOB to monitor 
progress and to provide support if requested. UNSCOB’s actions and tasks 
ware limited and included information and observations by groups patrolling 
near the northern borders of Greece. Their major task was to investigate 
whether the Greek guerillas were being supplied with weapons and other 
equipment by the neighboring communist states.33 The UNSCOB operation 
did not include all the characteristic of what was later considered as 
peacekeeping, however it was the first effort to place observers in the field to 
determine the facts.34 
2.1.2 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (1948-present)  
Because of the confusion concerning the United Nations Special Commission 
on the Balkans (UNSCOB), some consider UNTSO to be the first actual UN 
peacekeeping operation. UNTSO is crucial as a peacekeeping mission 
because it was the antecedent of six other missions established in the Middle 
East during the Cold War. It is acknowledged as an observer mission, and its 
task is to observe and oversee the cease-fire between Israel and its 
neighbors. One important function that UNTSO has achieved was its mandate 
to investigate local tensions as well as to pursue to control circumstances 
along the cease-fire lines which may have evolved into turbulence. 
The United Nations General Assembly, in November 1947, approved a plan 
for the separation of Palestine, providing for the establishment of an Arab 
State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international 
status.  Palestinian Arabs and Arab States and Palestinian Arabs rejected the 
plan. 
 The United Kingdom relinquished its mandate over the issue of Palestine and 
the State of Israel was proclaimed, on 14 May 1948.The next day, the 
Palestinian Arabs, supported by Arab States, started disputes against 
Israel. On 29 May 1948, the Security Council, in resolution 50 (1948), called 
for an ending of hostilities in Palestine and pronounced that the UN Mediator 
should oversee the truce, with the support of a military observers’ team. In 
June 1948, the first group of military observers, known as the United Nations 
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Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), went in the region. In 1949, 
UNTSO military observers continued to stay there in order to monitor the 
Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which for a long 
time constituted the central foundation of an unstable truce in the region. 
UNTSO actions are expanded over the five States including the parties of the 
Armistice Agreements:  Israel, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, 
and Egypt.  
Due to the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the actions of the observers 
changed, but they remained in the region, acting as go-betweens for the 
opposed parties and in a way by which isolated adverse facts could be 
restricted and prevented from developing into serious disputes. 
UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the 
nucleus of other peacekeeping operations on a temporary basis. The 
capability of UNTSO military observers to deploy after the Security 
Council acted to create a new mission has been a significant tool contributing 
to the initial effectiveness of such missions.  
2.1.3 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
(1949-present) 
 The third peacekeeping operation created by the UN in the first period, 
started in 1949 with a cease-fire compromise between India and Pakistan.  
UNTSO had a specific mission; to observe the cease-fire between the two 
countries, prevent negligible incidents from concluding into hostile disputes 
and oversee both state for compliance with the arms restriction agreement. 
Both the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
UNMOGIP as well as UNTSO demonstrate the significance of the political 
settlement, without that peacekeeping missions may be continued for many 
years.  After the end of the World War II, the decolonization process 
concerning the Indian Subcontinent signified a territorial dispute. India and 
Pakistan gained their autonomy from the British domination soon after the 
adoption of the Indian Independence Act of 1947. In addition this Act 
constituted the base for the independence of over 500 other sovereign states. 
Geography and religion made it quite simple for most states to join either India 
(mainly comprised of Hindu Provinces) or Pakistan (a Muslim state). One of 
the most crucial noteworthy questions was the case of Kashmir.112 Kashmir’s 
Hindu ruler did not  take into consideration the desires of the majority of 
Muslim population, which fact drove to an invasion by Pakistan, obligating 
Kashmir’s ruler to turn to India for military support. In October 1947, the 
accession of Kashmir to India led to a war breaking out between India and 
Pakistan.  Hilmarsdóttir argues that “the UN became involved following India’s 
complaint to the Security Council, that Pakistan was threatening international 
peace and security through its invasion of Kashmir. Pakistan maintained that 
the accession of Kashmir to India had been illegal and that a vote was 
necessary. This led to the hostilities between the two neighboring countries. 
The UN set up the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan 
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(UNCIP) to mediate between the two states, which managed to arrange a 
cease-fire, went into effect 1 January 1949.35 
2.2 The Assertive Period: 1956-1974  
In the end UN had a decisive role concerning the peacekeeping in 1956. The 
abovementioned peacekeeping operations, demonstrated specific elements 
according to which peacekeeping could be materialized. A host nation’s 
consent and impartiality of military observers provided a stable basis upon 
which the UN could conduct observer missions. In the beginning these 
operations were dealing with tasks such as reporting, observing and 
managing to minimize tensions caused by negligible disputes along cease-fire 
lines. Some crucial events took place during this period: With regard the case 
of UNSCOB, the General Assembly, promoted the mandate for peacekeeping 
mission and set a precedent for Assembly involvement. Furthermore it is 
important to mention that Hilmarsdóttir states that: this period also saw the 
formalization of the characteristics of peacekeeping in the sense that the 
factors of consent, the non-use of force and the use of military personnel 
evolved to become established principles of peacekeeping. Taking this fact 
into consideration nine peacekeeping missions were conducted in this period, 
however only a few will be discussed in this chapter.36 
2.2.1 United Nations Emergency Force I (1956-1967) 
The Suez Canal Company was nationalized by Egypt over the protest of 
France and the United Kingdom, ιn July 1956. On 13 October, the Security 
Council initiated a resolution introducing forth specific principles as regards 
the Canal operation. Consultations on the implementation of those principles 
were in progress when new disputes started in the broad area. 
Israel on 29 October 1956, invaded on Egypt and occupied Sinai and the 
Gaza Strip. The Security Council examined the abovementioned issue on 31 
October, but no agreement could be materialized, owing to the vetoes of 
France and the United Kingdom. According to "Uniting for Peace" resolution, 
the question was then transferred to the General Assembly, which met in 
emergency special session from 1 to 10 November. The Assembly called for a 
ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from occupied territories. 
Furthermore it set up the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to 
observe and oversee the cessation of disputes. Following the dispatch of the 
Emergency Force to the area, the French and British forces left the Suez 
Canal Zone by 22 December 1956. The withdrawal of the Israeli forces was 
completed by 8 March 1957.37 
                                                          
35 Hill and Malik, Peacekeeping and the United Nations, p. 31-32 
36 Ingunn Hilmarsdóttir, (2012) United Nations Peacekeeping, p.32-40 
 
37 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr1.html 
  
22 
 
The establishment of UNEF, actually the first United Nations peacekeeping 
force, provided an important innovation within the United Nations. UNEF was 
not just a peace-enforcement operation, as referred in Article 42 of the United 
Nations Charter, but a peacekeeping mission to be conducted with the 
consent and the collaboration of the parties to the conflict. This operation was 
an armed one, but the participants were to use their weapons only in self-
defense cases and even then with utmost restraint. Their central task was to 
oversee the withdrawal of the three occupying powers and, after the 
withdrawal was achieved, to work as a buffer between the Egyptian and 
Israeli forces and to secure the impartial supervision of the ceasefire. Finally, 
UNEF, was established completely on Egyptian area with the consent of the 
Government, patrolled the Egypt-Israel armistice demarcation line and the 
international frontier to the south of the Gaza Strip and brought relative quiet 
to a long-troubled area. 
2.2.2 United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (1958) 
 During 1958 ethnic tensions in Lebanon were evolved to be complicated by 
the interference of the United Arab Republic (UAR), concluding Syria and 
Egypt. The United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was 
established in order to confront this threat. It was totally different from the 
other peacekeeping missions in one crucial respect; the mandate limited it to 
just ascertain the events before the UN implement any further measures.  
Peacekeeping operations such as UNTSO, UNEF I and II and UNMOGIP had 
broader tasks that included observing, reporting and trying to defuse potential 
problem incidents. 
2.2.3 United Nations Operation in the Congo (1960-1964) 
ONUC was set up by Security Council resolution 143 (1960)38 of 14 July 
1960, by which it decided "to authorize the Secretary-General to take the 
necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the 
Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as might be 
necessary until, through that Government's efforts with United Nations 
technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion 
of the Government, to meet fully their tasks".39 
The primary mandate of ONUC was to secure the withdrawal of Belgian 
forces from the Republic of the Congo, to support the Government in 
implementing the law and order and to provide technical assistance. The UN 
operation in the Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 was one of largest 
operations tackled by the Organization. As Hilmarsdóttir argues: “ Apart from 
being one of the most complex peacekeeping operations of them all, it cost 
                                                          
38 https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement 
39 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onucM.htm 
 
  
23 
 
the UN greatly, both financially and in terms of lives, including that of the 
Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld”40 (Hilmarsdóttir,2012).    
2.2.4 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War-United Nations Emergency Force II 
(1974-1979) 
In the Middle East, on 6 October 1973, a war broke out again when 
concurrent, not expected, attacks were started against Israel by Egyptian 
forces crossing the Suez Canal and Syrian forces assaulting in the Golan 
Heights. The Egyptians advanced east of the canal. The Israelis responded 
and, when a cease-fire took place, both the Israelis and Egyptians had troops 
on either side of the canal. The UNEF I had worked as a buffer between 
Egyptian and Israeli forces from November 1956 until withdrawn at the 
demand of Egypt prior to the June 1967 war. Australia did not provide troops 
to that force. Following the October 1973 war, UNEF II was formed to oversee 
the cease-fire agreements between Egypt and Israel. On 18 January 1974 
and 4 September 1975, UNEF II was in charge of observing the redeployment 
of forces and manning and controlling the buffer zones east of Suez and in 
the Sinai Peninsula that were set up by those agreements.41 
2.3 The Inactive Period: 1974-1987  
After the creation of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF), the UN retreated significantly from new peacekeeping operations. 
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was the only one 
peacekeeping operation conducted during this period. This inaction can be 
interpreted as a reaction to the fact that the UN had extended itself 
substantially. UNIFIL showed that nothing had gone right with UN 
peacekeeping operations indicating the high costs, the refusal of the Member 
States to pay for the assessments, the lack of consent and the co-operation of 
disputants. These facts mean that peacekeeping operations could only 
achieve their goals if the majority of the criteria were present. UNIFIL’s 
mission was to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and 
maintain peace. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was conducting 
frequent invasions on Israeli territory with the contribution of the surrounding 
countries, including Lebanon. The PLO in Lebanon intensified the tensions in 
all over the country. In 1975, civil war broke out between Christians and 
Muslim groups, and this led Syria into complicated situation when it delivered 
forces into Lebanon stating that its objective was to secure stabilization within 
the country. Measures taken by Syria did not impede PLO attacks on Israel 
from Lebanese troops. In such circumstances and with high Jewish death 
rates, Israel decided to invade in Lebanon on 14 March 1978 in order to 
destroy PLO bases. The US concerned that this attack could minimize the 
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chance of a peace Treaty with Egypt.42 That’s why, the US requested the 
contribution of the UN and after four days the Security Council adopted 
resolutions 425 and 426 which called upon Israel to cease all military actions 
and withdraw its troops from Lebanon immediately. In 1985, the Israelis 
started a partial withdrawal but kept on maintaining a security zone in the 
border area. Even so, its failure to carry out its function has little to do with its 
own ability. UNIFIL without any doubt indicates that peacekeeping operations 
can only be profitable if appropriate conditions exist. 
2.4 Rebirth of Peacekeeping: 1988-1991 
At the end of the 1980’s, the international political system changed extremely. 
The UN had the chance to renew peacekeeping’s visibility and perceptibility in 
the international arena around the world when requested for help with 
disengaging the superpowers and support the conflict ridden nations that 
were left behind to find lasting peace. As Hilmarsdóttir states: “this led to 
problems in peacekeeping operations because resources for planning, 
deploying and maintaining operations were insufficient for the number, size 
and complexity of these operations” (Hilmarsdóttir,2012). During 1993, the UN 
encountered a credibility crisis when unexpected humanitarian catastrophes 
overwhelmed the organization in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.  In the 
post-Cold War, evolution of peacekeeping era starts with the perception that 
peacekeeping operations achievements in 1988-1991 led the UN to disregard 
the inherent inadequacies to carry out large multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
operations. The UN evolved to larger and more complex operations until 
recognizing its weakness with the failure of the second Angolan operation in 
1992. In the first three years of the  post-Cold War era peacekeeping 
operations were without any success for the UN. Having been inactive for 
over a decade, peacekeeping reemerged as a proper and successful means 
of resolving long-standing and unmanageable conflicts. By the end of 1991, 
the Organization developed to a trustworthy one, so much so that is was 
ready to conduct the largest and most costly operations ever undertaken in 
Cambodia.43 
2.5 Peacekeeping in the 1990s  
The end of the Cold War signaled the outset of a new time period in history as 
regards the UN peacekeeping. The reform of methods and approaches 
continued to exist during the 1990s. The deadlock between the two 
Superpowers collapsed and the Council’s paralysis ended. In addition, the 
raise of civil wars and actions of state violence against civilians led to a 
compulsion towards international involvement. These reasons paved the way 
for a fast increase in the number of peacekeeping operations were conducted 
by the UN.  67 UN peacekeeping operations took place since its creation, 49 
of them have deployed since 1990 (UN 2012 list of operations). This new 
changing of the Security Council authorized the UN to take part in more 
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dynamic missions. The UN started to set up forces to war areas before a 
ceasefire had been taken place with the purpose to either guard civilians in an 
act of humanitarian interference or to put an end in disputes by way of ‘peace 
enforcement’. However, in 1993, the situation changed dramatically after 
UNITAF, a US-led intervention in Somalia, provoked the death of 18 US 
soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu. Even so, peacekeeping operations 
continued to expand, specifically following the 1992 Agenda for Peace, 
drafted by the then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. In this report, the 
significance of continuing peace is underlined and it is mentioned that this 
could only be succeeded through the creation of stable institutions, the so 
called ‘peace building’. Consequently, the UN’s engagement within countries 
evolved into more expansive. Procedures like the Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration of warring parties (DDR) and the 
development of a state’s administrative capacity constitute part of 
peacekeeping operation mandates. These operations are known as ‘robust’, 
‘complex’ or ‘multi-dimensional’ peacekeeping operations, to emphasize the 
new scope and size. Usden and Juergenliemk argue that: “In 1992, the UN 
established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in order to 
design and manage the increasing number and growing size of operations. 
Before a resolution for a new peacekeeping operation has been passed, 
DPKO offers support with fact-finding operations. Upon adoption of a 
mandate, it deals with the logistical challenges of recruiting personnel, military 
forces and deploying the necessary equipment to the theatre. Upon the start 
of the operation, it acts as the interface between the Security Council and the 
mission on the ground. In the past few years, the DPKO has been 
restructured and the Department for Field Support (DFS) has been 
established to oversee logistics in the field”. 44 
2.6 Recent developments (The Brahimi Report) 
Peacekeeping has evolved into one of the most crucial challenges the United 
Nations (UN) has dealt with since the end of the Cold War because of the 
increase of civil wars in the 1990s. The Brahimi report was drafted in 2000 by 
a panel of ten specialists in response to the failures of UN peacekeeping in 
the 1990s, particularly in Rwanda and Srebrenica. In alignment with Boutros 
Boutros Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, the Brahimi report targeted in 
renewing the commitment of UN member states to the “maintenance of 
international peace and security” (Gray 2001). The report introduces 
recommendations in order to make better operational and doctrinal aspects of 
peacekeeping. It questioned the appropriateness of pre-Cold War traditional 
peacekeeping when dealing with “new wars”. Lauren Durand states that: “The 
progress made by peacekeeping since 2000 has been influenced by the 
publication of the report. First, post-Brahimi report missions have been 
characterized by the increasing participation of non-UN third parties and 
regional organizations. Furthermore, as recommended by Brahimi, 
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peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have moved away from neutrality to 
become instead impartial and robust. Finally, immediate relief is no longer the 
first priority of the UN” (Durand, 2011). Instead, reconstruction, development 
and sustainable peace have been developed to one of the crucial priorities of 
the organization, which is aiming to promote peacebuilding. As long 
improvements have been remarked, the UN must “continue to strengthen the 
peacekeeping machinery” and renew the commitment of states for future 
achievements (Ban 2010). 
“The Brahimi report is not an achievement in itself since very few of the 
recommendations made were implemented or implemented properly. 
However, the report greatly contributed to the progress of peacekeeping by 
highlighting its operational and doctrinal flaws” (Durand, 2011). The UN and its 
partners understood the seriousness of the case and introduced a number of 
reports aiming to reform peacekeeping. One of such reports constitutes the 
2008 capstone doctrine that demonstrates the principles and guidelines of 
PKOs. Post-2000 peacekeeping is referred to an escalating engagement of 
transnational and regional organizations that enhance the credibility and 
feasibility of the mandates. In addition, more robust operations have removed 
peacekeepers from neutrality and impel them to engage in impartiality in order 
not to be complicit in crimes against humanity. Beyond any doubt, the Brahimi 
report was the first move towards the “humanitarianisation” of peacekeeping 
and responsible for peacebuilding and development objectives. Nevertheless, 
regardless of all the good signs that peacekeeping have shown since 2000 
and the few achievements registered by the UN, PKOs still deals with crucial 
operational questions because of the lack of funds and resources and the 
disengagement of TCCs.45  
2.7 The present 
Today, more than 110,000 military, police and civilian staff simultaneously 
serve in 14 peacekeeping operations, demonstrating a reduction in both 
personnel and peacekeeping missions due to the peaceful transitions and the 
rebuilding of functioning states.  Nevertheless, the decrease in personnel and 
peacekeeping missions in the current years without any doubt shows that the 
confrontations faced by the UN are minimizing. The existence of new hostiles 
expanding beyond local and regional borders indicate that the request for field 
operations is expected to stay high and peacekeeping is going to be one of 
the UN’s most complicated operational missions. In addition, the political 
complication facing peacekeeping operations and the scope of their 
mandates, together with the civilian aspect, remain very broad. There are 
clear evidences that particular specialized organs such as police, will be in 
exceptionally high demand over the following years. Today’s multidimensional 
peacekeeping will maintain to improve the political procedure, assist in 
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, 
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protect civilians, support the organization of elections, assist in restoring 
the rule of law and protect and promote human rights .46 
Chapter 3: Regional peacekeeping operations 
3.1 The African Union (AU) 
For many decades, Africa has been the central area of deployment as regards 
the international peace operations—not only because of the instability and 
fragility that characterize the region, but also for the reason that the Security 
Council has fewer conflicting interests than in the case of other regions and 
countries (e.g. the Middle East), allowing the Security Council to reach 
agreement on mandating and conducting peacekeeping missions. 
African countries are improving, with an extremely fast pace, their policies for 
participation in multilateral peace operations, whether in the framework of the 
UN, the AU, or in coalitions of the willing. Central among these member states 
are Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has risen to become the 
largest troop contributor country in the UN regarding the peacekeeping 
operations, and also constitutes the largest contributor to AU peace 
operations, with its 4395-strong contingent in AMISOM in Somalia (AMISOM 
2014).47 
Three main peacekeeping operations have been conducted by the African 
Union since the inaugural summit meeting of the AU in July 2002: in Burundi 
(2003), the Darfur region of Sudan (2006), and Somalia (2007) (Mark 
Malan,2008) . 
3.1.1 Burundi  
The first full-fledged peacekeeping operation for the African Union took place 
in Burundi. After a continued civil war that break out in 1994, a peace process 
led by the President of Tanzania, the late Julius Nyerere —and later by former 
President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela —concluded on August 28, 2000 
in the signing of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for 
Burundi. The Arusha Agreement determined that “immediately following the 
signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the 
United Nations (UN) a request for an international peacekeeping 
force.”48However, the implementation of the Agreement was quite slow, and 
disputes remained.  
Given the fact that the UN would not mandate the conducting of a 
peacekeeping operation in the absence of an inclusive cease-fire, South 
Africa launched a Protection Support Detachment in October 2000 in order to 
protect select exiled leaders who came back to participate in the agreed-upon 
political process. Two cease-fire agreements took place next—the first signed 
by the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Burundi Armed 
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Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) on October 7, 2002; the second 
agreement signed by the TGoB and the Conseil national pour la defense de la 
democratie-Forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Pierre 
Nkurunziza, on December 2, 2002. The Palipehutu–Forces nationales de 
liberation (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa remained outside these processes, and it 
continued to use force of arms. 
Τhe AU approved the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), ιn 
April 2003, with a task to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire 
agreements; support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of 
ex-combatants; establish favorable circumstances for the creation of a UN 
peacekeeping operation; and provide support concerning the political and 
financial stability in Burundi. 
Malan argues that: “AMIB had a maximum strength of 3,335 troops, with 
military contingents from South Africa (1,600), Ethiopia (858), and 
Mozambique (228), as well as the AU observer element (43) drawn from 
Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia. AMIB started the 
establishment of its headquarters on April 27, 2003. However, it was not until 
the arrival of the contingents from Ethiopia and Mozambique (September 27 
to October 23, 2003) that the force became fully operational. The force was 
concentrated in Bujumbura, with the South African and Ethiopian contingents 
expected to establish demobilization centers in the provinces to canton and 
disarm an estimated total of 20,000 ex-combatants” (Mark Malan,2008) . 
AMIB was unable to enforce the implementation of the cease-fire agreements 
completely, as well as it was not able to secure stability in Burundi in 
cooperation with newly established national defense and security practices. 
Failure to develop good relations and to collaborate with the TGoB on the 
designation and security of identified preassembly and disarmament centers, 
accompanied with the absence of full cooperation from the APPMs, led to the 
inefficiency of the operation to make much headway with the DDR process. 
From the beginning, the AU had worked on the precondition that AMIB was a 
holding mission pending the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. On 
May 31, 2004, the function of AMIB came to an end. Effective June 1, 2004, 
the responsibility for peace operations in Burundi was assumed by the UN 
Operation in Burundi (ONUB)  mandated by Security Council Resolution 1545 
(2004), on May 21, 2004. 
3.1.2 Darfur 
 A cruel humanitarian catastrophe started to culminate in Sudan’s western 
region of Darfur, in February 2003. In a year, more than one million displaced 
in a well-coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing by government-supported 
militia and tens of thousands of civilians died. The U.S. Congress passed a 
nonbinding resolution characterizing the Darfur situation “genocide”, in July 
2004; then, in September 2004, the  Secretary of State Colin Powell called the 
consistent and widespread patterns of dislocations, killings, and rapes in 
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Darfur “genocide” too, and he blamed the government of Sudan and the 
Janjawiid militia as responsible of that crisis. No stable steps followed in order 
to impede the atrocities, but the AU had been putting pressure on the 
Sudanese government to stop the militias, and it had started dialogue with 
Khartoum to approve an African peacekeeping force of two thousand to 
supervise the safety in Darfur, protect civilians, and promote the provision of 
humanitarian aid. 150 Rwandan soldiers reached in Darfur as the vanguard of 
this force, on August 15, 2004. After a week, Nigeria’s parliament voted to 
send in 1,500 troops. Until the end of August 2004, the AU had 305 soldiers in 
Darfur acting as cease-fire monitoring mechanism, and the UN was 
cooperating with the AU on plans to increase force levels.49 By early 2006, the 
African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had almost 6,000 military and 1,500 police in 
the ground. 
The fact that the operation deployed at all, and that it was capable of 
expanding from a force of less than four hundred to over seven thousand in a 
brief time, is a credit to the AU, but there was a significant absence of ability 
to set objectives; civilian, military planning, and integrate police; sequence 
deployment; provide logistic support; and mainly to deploy the operation in a 
intelligible manner. Partners have played a crucial role in AMIS, supporting 
technically and economically. The downside of this large-scale involvement, 
nevertheless, is that it has established a continuing dependence, making the 
aspect of African “ownership” of African missions ever more implausible. 
The net result of severely restrict AMIS and AU capability is that the 
operation’s preventive outcome has been very limited. An AU Joint 
Assessment Mission (JAM)—with U.S., EU and UN participation—which was 
conducted in March 2005 concluded: AMIS played a key role where it was 
present, but huge areas of Darfur kept beyond its reach; neither the 
expectations on which the operation was designed nor those on which the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was planned had been borne out; and 
AMIS had not achieved in establishing a safe environment. 
The AU Peace and Security Council, on November 30,in 2006, provided the 
Addis plan and further determined that the hybrid operation should profit from 
UN “backstopping” and command and control practices. On December 19, 
2006, the Security Council approved the Addis Ababa results and the AU 
communiqué, called for their immediate implementation, and also asked for all 
parties to ease the deployment of the UN light and heavy support packages 
as well as a hybrid mission in Darfur without delay. On December 23, 2006, in 
a letter to the secretary-general, President Al-Bashir reassured the willingness 
of the authorities of the Sudan to implement the Addis Ababa conclusions and 
the Abuja communiqué. In addition, the government of the Sudan let the 
African Union to know of its approval of the resolution of the Peace and 
Security Council. 
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 However, as Malan mentions “ the deployment of both the heavy support 
package and the AU-UN force remains stalled, and it is unlikely that the hybrid 
force will materialize before 2008. This is due to the perennial problems of 
force generation and of finding UN member states that are willing and able to 
volunteer the quantity and quality of personnel and equipment required for an 
effective mission of this size in a hostile operational environment” (Mark 
Malan,2008) . 
3.1.3 Somalia 
In late 1993, the death of seventeen U.S. soldiers in Somalia signaled the 
outset of the end for a U.S.–UN peacekeeping operation that finally left 
Somalia in 1995. The operation removed with few of its mandate goals 
succeeded, making Somalia a state of anarchy. The latest phase of civil war 
started in May 2006 with the Union of Islamic Courts’ (ICU) conquest of 
Mogadishu from the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-
Terrorism (ARPCT), and it kept going with further ICU extension in the 
country. Ethiopian government involved with forces in support of the 
Transitional Federal Government, in July 2006.  
During the period from December 24, 2006 to early January 2007, the UIC—
which had under control of eight of Somalia’s eighteen administrative 
regions—was removed by Transitional Federal Government troops and 
Ethiopian forces. Remnants of the UIC militia were violently pursued in 
southern Somalia. The similarity of order and security that the UIC had 
established started to fade, and public displeasure of the presence of 
Ethiopian troops in Somalia generated an unstable situation that limited 
humanitarian emergency missions in the central and southern regions of the 
state. 
On February 20, 2007, the UN Security Council, operating under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, approved the conduct of AMISOM in order to enhance 
discussion and reconciliation in Somalia by supporting the security of all those 
engaged with the procedure; to guarantee the safety of the Transitional 
Federal Government institutions and secure the central infrastructure; to 
oversee the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, 
specifically the recreation of Somali security forces; and to provide support for 
humanitarian assistance.50 
AMISOM is to contain an initial three battalions, increasing to a total of nine 
battalions of 850 soldiers each. In March 2007, Uganda started the troop 
deployment. By June the two Ugandan battalions, about 1,600 troops, 
constituted the only AMISOM troops in Somalia. In late July, the government 
of Burundi pointed out that it could be prepared to situate troops to Somalia—
few  months after Security Council approval and shortly before AMISOM’s six-
month mandate expires. As regards AMIS and the organized hybrid operation 
for Darfur, it is noticed a lack of willingness from African states to support with 
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personnel and equipment an AU operation in a non friendly security 
environment. 
 In Somalia, as it happened in Darfur, the AU continues to remain entirely 
based on donor funding and on external technical assistance for the 
preparation and management of the operation. Last October, the latter 
practice was stressed as a crucial weakness at the IPA workshop on AMIS, 
and it was identified during the Africa–G8 meeting in Evian in June 2003. The 
Joint Plan obliviously acknowledged an unstable strategic management 
capability for multidimensional peace missions within both the AU and 
regional organizations as a major obstacle to achieving the requisite peace 
operations capacities. Yet the UN and the interested international 
community—Africa’s “donor partners”— keeps on  approving and conducting 
new AU operations like AMISOM with apparently scant regard for the reason 
that Africa only started establishing modest regional peace and security 
structures and abilities during the past decade, while the vastly more capable 
UN has had approximately sixty years of experience in peacekeeping.51 
3.2 European Union (EU) 
3.2.1 The EU-UN partnership 
Over the past decade, the EU and the UN have developed cordial relations 
and become real partners as regards the crisis management. Since the EU-
UN Joint Declaration of September 2003, the two organizations have 
gradually stabilized and institutionalized their cooperation in ways unmatched 
by other institutions. The EU and the UN together have collaborated in the 
ground through many and different actions and practices, from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). For that 
reason these two institutions have demonstrated a specific capability to adopt 
practices in order to easily be adapted to the new environment of international 
crisis management, which is by nature multi-actor and demands a high rate of 
cooperation. Lately, the Dutch and Swedish participation to the UN mission in 
Mali signaled the European come back to UN peacekeeping that has been 
especially welcomed on the UN side.  
The 2012 EU ‘Action Plan on CSDP support to UN peacekeeping’ 
accompanied with the EU-UN collaboration in the ground, has improved even 
more this partnership. It comes to its two-year conclusion in this rather 
positive context and, in all likelihood, will be refreshed in a format still to be 
agreed upon. 
As Pietz and Tardy indicate “Cooperation may also allow the two institutions 
to confront common challenges, most notably in relation to the management 
of the pool of trained personnel, training certification procedures, and bridging 
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the gap between preliminary training and actual deployment. As a matter of 
good practice, Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management 
(ENTRi) has targeted both CSDP and UN personnel for its training courses, 
which include pre-deployment modules for countries where both organizations 
are present. Such cooperation might well be widened and intensified”. (Tobias 
Pietz and Thierry Tardy, 2014). 
Over the past decade, rule of law and SSR practices have constituted the 
basis of both UN and EU operations. Nevertheless, rule of law and SSR, are 
two terms that can be interpreted with various ways and also the 
implementation of them in the field still differ. Even if, the UN has been 
capable of achieving system-wide over the past decade cooperation on these 
questions, internal cohesion on the CSDP side still constitutes a challenge. 
That said, with the Action Plan and the ‘modalities for coordination’, organs 
are ready to exert joint attempts on SSR to a new degree. Both documents 
emphasize to these areas as a means of developing good coordination, 
calling, for example, on the EU for a ‘division of labor and 
complementarities/synergies with UN planned activities in the rule of law and 
security sectors’. Synergies could be succeeded by training together, co-
locating units or SSR personnel, deploying joint assessment operations and 
after-action reviews, as well as establishing a standing working group on the 
rule of law and SSR and which serves the two institutions.52 
3.2.2 The participation of EU in PKOs 
ALTHEA/BiH 
The European Union’s Military Contribution to the Stabilization and Integration 
of Bosnia Herzegovina into European Family Nations. The mandate for 
EUFOR’s Operation Althea is in two parts, Executive and Non-Executive. The 
Executive mandate is given by the UN Security Council, and the EUFOR is 
then based on the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) Joint Action which 
includes an Executive part derived from the UN Security Council (Supporting 
the BiH authorities maintain a safe and secure environment). It also includes 
and a Non-Executive part (Capacity Building and Training for the AFBiH). This 
supports BiH in its progress to being a ‘security provider’ rather than a 
‘security consumer’.53 
EU NAVFOR Somalia 
The European Union is concerned with the effect of Somali-based piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. 
As a result, and as part of its Integrated Approach to Somalia, the EU 
launched the European Union Naval Force ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR) in 
December 2008 within the framework of the European Common Security and 
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Defense Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with the UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR) 54 and International Law.55 
EUAM Iraq  
The EU Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM 
Iraq) was launched to respond to the request for advice and assistance by the 
Iraqi government. The Mission has an initial mandate for one year. It will focus 
on assisting the Iraqi authorities in the implementation of the civilian aspects 
of the Iraqi security strategy.56 
EUAM Ukraine 
The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine is a non-executive 
mission of the European Union that formally began operations from its 
headquarters in Kyiv on 1 December 2014.The goal is to achieve a civilian 
security sector that is efficient, accountable, and enjoys the trust of the 
public.57 
EUBAM Libya 
On 22 May 2013, the Council of the European Union gave the green light for 
EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya). Libya, a civilian Mission 
under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), to support the 
Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s 
borders.58 
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (This Mission is not managed by CSDP structures)  
The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine 
(EUBAM) was launched in 2005. The legal basis for EUBAM is the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the European Commission and the 
Governments of Moldova and Ukraine on 7 October 2005.59 
EUBAM Rafah 
The European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point- 
code name EUBAM Rafah- was launched on November 2005, to monitor the 
operation of the border crossing point between Gaza Strip and Egypt, after 
the Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on 
Movement and Access on 15 November 2005.60 
EUCAP Somalia 
In July 2012, the EU launched EUCAP (European Union Capacity) Nestor, a 
civilian mission which assists host countries develop self-sustaining capacity 
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for enhancement of maritime security. EUCAP Somalia contributes to the 
establishment and capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement 
capability in Somalia, including Somaliland.61 
EUCAP Sahel Mali 
 EUCAP Sahel Mali is a European Union civilian mission based in Bamako, 
Mali. It was launched on 15 January 2015, following an official invitation by 
the Malian government to assist the internal security forces with reasserting 
the government's authority over the whole of the country, following the 
'Northern Mali Crisis' that left large parts of the country under the control of 
various factions.62 
EUCAP Sahel Niger 
The Sahel has a prominent place in European Union policy. Europe has 
numerous interests in the region, ranging from combating security threats, 
terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration to assuring energy security.63 
EULEX Kosovo 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was 
launched in 2008 as the largest civilian mission under the Common Security 
and Defense Policy of the European Union. EULEX’s overall mission is to 
assist the Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule 
of law institutions.  The Mission’s current mandate has been launched to 
cover the period until 14 June 2020 based on Council Decision CFSP 
2018/856. EULEX works within the framework of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244.64 
EUMM Georgia 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, (EUMM). It is an unarmed 
civilian monitoring mission of the European Union. It was deployed in 
September 2008 following the EU-mediated Six Point Agreement which 
ended the August war. 
Their priorities are: 
• to ensure that there is no return to hostilities; 
• to facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local 
communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines 
(ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; 
• to build confidence among the conflict parties; 
• to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider region65 
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EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia 
EUNAVFOR MED – European Union Naval Force-Mediterranean operation 
Sophia is but one element of a broader EU comprehensive response to the 
migration issue, which seeks to address not only its physical component, but 
also its root causes as well including conflict, poverty, climate change and 
persecution.66 
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories 
EUPOL COPPS, established on 1 January 2006, is the EU Police and Rule of 
Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories. Initially the Mission was 
established as a Police Mission comprising a Police Advisory Section. In 2008 
a Rule of Law Section was added. EUPOL COPPS (the EU Coordination 
Office for Palestinian Police Support), mainly through these two sections, 
assists the Palestinian Authority in building its institutions, for a future 
Palestinian state, focused on security and justice sector reforms.67 
EUTM RCA 
Military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) in letter 
dated 8 October 2015, the Chef de l’Etat de la Transition of the Central 
African Republic (CAR), Mrs Catherine Samba-Panza, invited the European 
Union to further support the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) through a 
reinforced operational training structure in full collaboration with United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central 
African Republic.68 
EUTM Somalia 
On 10 April 2010, the EU launched a military training mission (EUTM 
Somalia) in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia. Initially, training took place 
in Uganda due to the security situation in Somalia at that time, and in close 
collaboration with the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF). On 22 
January 2013, the Council of the European Union extended the mandate of 
EUTM Somalia to March 2015. This 3rd Mission Mandate contained a 
significant change of Mission focus, with the addition of strategic advisory and 
mentoring activities to complement the training role. In the first months of 
2014 EUTM – S Mission HQ was relocated to Mogadishu, along with all 
advisory, mentoring and training activities, which lead to the closure of all 
locations in Uganda.69 
EUTM-Mali 
In order to continue providing military training and advice to the Malian Armed 
Forces the Council of the European Union decided in 23 March 2016, EUTM 
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Mali’s Fourth Mandate, this will last until 18 May 2020. EUTM Mali will train, 
advice and educate the MaAF under the control of legitimate civilian 
authorities, in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity 
with a view to enabling them to conduct military operations aiming at restoring 
Malian integrity, protecting the population and reducing the threat posed by 
terrorist groups.70 
3.3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
NATO-Relations with the United Nations 
United Nations (UN) and the NATO are obligated to oversee and maintain the 
peace and security around the world. Since the early 1990s, the two 
institutions have been collaborating in this stage conducting peace-support 
and crisis-management missions. The difficulty of current’s security 
challenges demands a more comprehensive discussion between NATO and 
the UN. This has driven to better coordination and liaison arrangements 
between the personnel of the two organizations, as well as UN specialized 
agencies. 
3.3.1 Framework for Cooperation with UN 
In September 2008, based on the experience of over a decade of 
cooperation, the Secretaries General of the two institutions accepted to create 
a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation. Since the signing of 
the 2008 framework, collaboration has continued to be improved in a 
workable way, taking into consideration each organization’s particular task, 
procedures, expertise and capacities. Regular exchanges and communication 
at senior and working levels on political and operational questions have been 
developed to a standard characteristic of the inter-institutional relationship. 
Secretary General of NATO reports to the UN Secretary-General on regular 
basis regarding the progress in UN-mandated NATO-led missions and on 
other crucial decisions of the North Atlantic Council, including in the 
environment of crisis management and in the battle against terrorism. The UN 
is often invited to attend NATO ministerial meetings and summits; the NATO 
Secretary General participates in the UN General Assembly; and staff level 
meetings, covering the broad range of cooperation and dialogue, take place 
on an annual basis between the secretariats of NATO and the UN.71 
3.3.2 NATO’s Operations and Missions 
NATO is a key actor and essential contributor as regards the international 
peace and security. It promotes democratic values and is responsible for the 
normal and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Nevertheless, in case of failure of 
the diplomatic attempts, it has the military ability needed to conduct crisis 
management missions, separately or in coordination with other states and 
international organizations. 
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NATO in Afghanistan 
At the present time NATO is the main Resolute Support, a non-combat 
operation which promotes guidance, training and support to Afghan security 
staff and institutions. Resolute Support was established on 1 January 2015. It 
consists of about 16,200 personnel from both NATO and participant states 
and works with one hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes in Herat (western 
Afghanistan), Mazar-e Sharif (northern Afghanistan), Laghman (eastern 
Afghanistan) and Kandahar (southern Afghanistan). 
Central functions are: “supporting planning, programming and budgeting; 
assuring transparency, accountability and oversight; supporting the 
adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance; supporting 
the establishment and sustainment of processes such as force generation, 
recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel”72. 
The legal framework of the Resolute Support Mission is based on an official 
invitation from the Afghan Government and the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) between Afghanistan and NATO, which oversees the existence of 
Allied troops. In addition the Resolute Support is endorsed by the international 
community and it is mentioned to the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 2189, unanimously approved on 12 December 2014. This 
resolution is followed by the new Resolute Support Mission and underlines the 
significance of sustained international assistance for the solidity of 
Afghanistan. 
Resolute Support is an operation occurring as a consequence to the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). From August 2003 to 
December 2014, ISAF was under leadership of NATO. It was created after a 
call for support by the Afghan government and by a UN mandate in 2001 to 
impede terrorists to get once again the leading role in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, ISAF was authorized to deploy new Afghan security forces and 
enhance Afghan authorities to provide efficient security around the country 
with the purpose to establish favorable conditions to the functioning of 
democratic institutions and the implementation of the rule of law. 
Until today, the operation in Afghanistan constitutes the Alliance's most 
important operational commitment. Furthermore, apart from Resolute Support 
and ISAF, Allies and partners states are committed to the wider international 
community's support for the long-term economical help of the Afghan security 
forces. NATO authorities have also reassured their commitment to a 
continuing cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan, by reinforcing 
political consultations and useful coordination within the context of the NATO-
Afghanistan Enduring Partnership created in 2010. 
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NATO in Kosovo 
Even if, Afghanistan remains NATO's top priority, the Alliance has not faltered 
on its other commitments, specifically in the Balkans. Nowadays, almost 
4,000 allied and partner forces are deployed in Kosovo as part of NATO's 
Kosovo Force (KFOR). 
Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt 
the humanitarian disaster, KFOR troops continue to preserve a forceful 
existence around the area. 
In February 2008, after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, NATO 
continued to deploy its troops in accordance with the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244. Since then it has contributed to establish a professional and 
multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force, which is a softly armed force in charge of 
security missions that are inappropriate for the police. For the time being, 
development has been noticed in the European Union-sponsored Dialogue 
between Belgrade and Pristina. The restoration of relations between Serbia 
and Kosovo constitutes a crucial factor for the resolution of the political crisis 
over northern Kosovo. 
Securing the Mediterranean Sea 
NATO missions are not restricted only to zones of dispute. After the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, NATO right away started to adopt practices in order to 
increase the options available to confront the threat of international terrorism.  
In October 2001, it launched the maritime surveillance Operation Active 
Endeavour aiming to detect and prevent terrorist actions in the Mediterranean. 
In October 2016, the mission ended and was accomplished by Sea Guardian, 
a flexible maritime mission able to conduct the various maritime security 
operations tasks. 
Sea Guardian is conducting three main missions in the Mediterranean Sea: 
maritime situational awareness, support to capacity-building and counter-
terrorism at sea. In addition, if authorized by Allies, it could also conduct other 
tasks like conducting interdiction tasks, upholding freedom of navigation and 
protecting critical infrastructure. In general terms, it is contributing to keep a 
secure and out of danger maritime environment while enhacing the Alliance's 
three crucial tasks: crisis management, cooperative security and collective 
defense. 
Training mission in Iraq 
In July 2018, the "NATO Mission Iraq" was officially started at the Brussels 
Summit, at the request of the Iraqi leaders and in accordance with the Global 
Coalition to Defeat ISIS. It constitutes a non-combat training and capacity-
building operation that consists of some hundred NATO trainers. These 
trainers will support the Iraqi troops to protect their country and the broader 
region against terrorism and prevent the re-emergence of ISIS. The operation 
will be created on current attempts to train Iraqi instructors in sectors such as 
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confronting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), military medicine, armored 
vehicles maintenance and civil-military planning. In addition, it will contribute 
in establishing military schools to raise the professionalism of the Iraqi troops 
and support to preserve more efficient, transparent and comprehensive 
national security structures and institutions. 
During the period between 2004 and 2011, NATO organized relatively small 
but crucial support operations in Iraq that contains mentoring, training and 
supporting the Iraqi Security Forces, the so called NATO Training Mission in 
Iraq (NTM-I). 
Supporting the African Union 
Except for the Euro-Atlantic region, the organization continues to help the 
African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping operations on the Africa. Since June 
2007, NATO has supported the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by 
providing air- and sealift assistance for AU peacekeepers following renewed 
AU requests. Moreover, NATO is providing capacity-building support, as well 
as expert training support to the African Standby Force (ASF), at the AU's 
request. The ASF aims to be conducted in Africa in times of crisis and is part 
of the AU's attempts to promote long-term peacekeeping practices. ASF 
represents the AU's vision for a continental, on-call security apparatus with 
some similarities to the NATO Response Force. 
Air policing 
Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has 
adopted some more practical measures for its Allies. Among these is the 
enhancing of NATO's air policing operations. 
Air policing missions are collective peacetime operations that help NATO to 
detect, observe and identify all infringements and violations of its airspace in 
order to take the appropriate measures. NATO fighter jets oversee the 
airspace of Allies who do not possess fighter jets of their own. NATO has 
provided extra aircrafts to strengthen missions over Montenegro, Albania, and 
Slovenia, as well as the Baltic region, where NATO F-16s have frequently 
restrained Russian aircrafts violating Allied airspace. 
This air policing mission is one of three NATO lasting forces on active duty 
that help to the Alliance's collective defense efforts on a regular basis. They 
also contain NATO's standing maritime forces, which are prepared to operate 
when called upon, as well as an integrated air defense system to protect 
against air attacks, which also includes the Alliance's ballistic missile defense 
system. 
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Chapter 4: The Greek Participation in PKOs 
4.1 Greece and UN 
Greece in the Security Council  
On October 15th, 2004, Hellas, together with Japan, Argentina, Denmark and 
Tanzania, was voted as a non permanent member to the Security Council. In 
1952-1953, Greece held a non permanent position in the Security Council for 
the last time. The Security Council’s primary objective is to maintain the 
international peace and security, an actually difficult task. Since 1990 the 
Council has changed its practices of work as well as its agenda, while the 
workload itself has increased considerably. It has been developed to a more 
active organ and also has acknowledged the interaction of the issues that 
were not generally part of its area of activity.  
During the two-year term in the Council, Greece was guided by the main 
principles of the foreign policy which are: dedication to peace, respect for 
international law, democracy and human rights, eradication of poverty and 
hunger and the strengthening of international cooperation among all the 
people of the world. In close cooperation with the other partners of the 
Security Council and in accordance with the international justice and legality, 
Greece shows its willingness to support unstable regions by making serious 
efforts to establish lasting peace and protect people’s lives.  
Members of the Council entrusted Greece with the Chairmanship of two 
fundamental sanctions Committees, on Cote d’lvoire and on Sudan, as well as 
the Chairmanship of the Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions. 
Greece also held the vice-chairmanship of the Council’s Counter-Terrorism 
Committee. 
Greece was and continues to be obligated to contribute with all its available 
means in order to reinforce and acknowledge UN as the protector of the 
international law and to maintain the peaceful coexistence and cooperation 
amongst humans of the world.73 
4.2 Greece and NATO 
Membership to NATO constitutes a significant factor of Greece’s defense and 
security architecture along with its EU membership. Since its accession in 
1952, Greece not only has been an active member of Euro-Atlantic 
contributing in security but also has been protected by the security umbrella 
the Alliance provides its members. 
Since Greece is one of the oldest members of the Alliance, a wide consensus 
has been formed among its residents about the special and crucial role of 
NATO in guarantying the common defense and security of its members. This 
consensus was developed in a gradual way despite times when Greeks were 
profoundly concerned about the country’s relationship with NATO. At the 
present time, citizens together with the politicians, under the difficulties of the 
                                                          
73 https://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/en/un-en/greece-in-organization/peace-and-
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contemporary security environment, acknowledge that NATO has stopped to 
be a simply military alliance and has been developed into a political 
organization of wider scope. In additions, Greece’s stability has been boosted 
importantly. Being situated in a strategically significant region, Greece has 
earned a security dividend. 
Greece’s participation proved favorable for the security and stability of both 
Greece and its Allies in NATO. Its important geostrategic position widened the 
Alliance’s perimeter and the stability zone of Europe. It is very important to 
mention that Greece actively participates in all NATO missions, 
encompassing the Libyan crisis when it contributed in Operation Unified 
Protector from the first moment, providing its air and naval assets as well as 
its most important bases in Crete and Peloponnesus to the Allied forces. 
Membership into Alliance has unquestionably had an advantageous result for 
Greece because it has increased remarkably the chances to reform defense 
capacities and generate the appropriate stability and security for development 
in the political, economical and civil sector. Greek participation increased and 
boosted the military forces’ outreach opportunities to all aspects of defense 
reform including organizational improvements, concept development, 
enhancing operational capabilities, infrastructure, training and 
standardization.74 
4.3 Greece and EU 
Greece’s contribution to the Common Security and Defense Policy 
During the Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2003, the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) was drafted. In this document, the European Union 
clarifies its security strategy, which is aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a 
better world, identifying the threats facing the Union, defining its strategic 
objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe.75 The ESS has 
ever since constituted a basis of reference for both ESDP, and its successor, 
CSDP, up until the demonstration of the EU Global Strategy on foreign and 
security policy by the High Representative in June 2016. In this framework, 
Greece was actively involved in the drafting procedure of the Global Strategy. 
 
Apart from ESS, significant developments regarding many aspects of the 
(then) ESDP were carried out during the Hellenic Presidency of the Council, in 
2003: “deployment of the first civilian ESDP Mission EUPM in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, deployment of the first military ESDP operation CONCORDIA in 
FYROM, finalization of the EU-NATO relations  framework, launching of the 
first training programs on ESDP, and major steps towards the establishment 
of an agency in the field of defense cooperation and military equipment (the 
European Defense Agency)”76. 
                                                          
74 https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/turkey-greece/greece-nato-partnership/en/index.htm 
75 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar00004 
76 https://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/greece-in-the-eu/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-
csdp.html 
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During the latest Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the EU (1st semester 
of 2014),  Greece conducted various activities in the field of the CSDP, for 
instance Informal Meetings, seminars and workshops focusing on questions 
of maritime security and surveillance, enhancement of military capabilities, 
sustainability of the defense sector and cyber-security . It is important to 
mention that, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Presidency tasks concerning CFSP/CSDP issues are fulfilled by the HR/VP 
and, so the role of the rotating Presidency is constrained to supporting 
activities. 
Greece is an active contributor enhancing CSDP continuously, within the 
context of supporting the EU Global Strategy, with the purpose to secure the 
Union’s strategic self-governance, to strengthen the EU’s role as a trustworthy 
international stability and security contributor, as well as in efficiently 
confronting and preventing challenges.  
4.4 Ongoing Activities 
The participation of the Hellenic armed forces in KFOR 
Since June 1999, NATO has had a leading role in peace support mission in 
Kosovo (KFOR) in support of broader international attempts to establish 
peace and stability in the area. 
Greece provided facilities to facilitate the advance of personnel and 
equipment to Skopje in the framework of "JOINT Guardian" Plan, authorized 
by NAC, on the 10th of June 1999. The Multinational Force, under the U.N. 
guidelines, is known as Kosovo Force (KFOR). 
KFOR’s mandate is based on the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between 
NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR is deployed 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and for that reason constitutes a peace 
enforcement mission, which is more broadly mentioned to as a peace support 
operation. 
The Greek Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defense, 
on 11th June 1999, determined that Greece would take part in with a force at 
Brigade Level, providing support for the conduction of the operation. The 
Greek Force was known as Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo. The objective of 
the Contingent was to establish a harmless environment for the citizens in 
Kosovo and guarantee a secure return of the refugees and those who had 
been removed from Kosovo. 
Participation of Hellenic Forces: 
After a Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defense 
decision, the 34th Mechanized Brigade consisting of 1162 men, was 
established in Kosovo. In addition, one (1) C-130 a/c with 10- crew members 
and 30 Officers and Soldiers were allocated to man Allied Staffs, HQs and 
Commands, as well as 157 Officers and soldiers to provide Host-Nation 
Support. 
The Contingent includes also one (1) Infantry Company with Engineer 
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Elements, consisting of 60 Officers and Soldiers, as well as one Support 
Detachment and one (1) Facilities Detachment with a total force of 10. The 
Company was stationed at Communication Zone South, in Thessaloniki. 
The Brigade was stationed at different camps, "Megas Alexandras" in 
Kosovo- Polije, camp "Rigas Fereos" at Urosevac and camp "Tobacco 
Factory" at Mitrovica. All above camps were established in a short time by the 
Hellenic Army mostly by the 34th Engineer Battalion. 
The Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo deployed hundreds of reconnaissance, 
escorting, traffic security and control missions. It allocated personnel to man 
seven (7) check points and assumed the responsibility to conduct and 
command the traffic control operations in the road axis connecting FYROM 
with Pristina and the border station of "Kosovo-FYROM". 
Furthermore, Hellenic military personnel protected, on a 24 hour basis, two (2) 
Weapon Staging Areas, for arms collected from UCK, and prepared arms 
transportation and destruction. The most important success of the Greek 
Contingent was the finding of an ammunition depot in which a big number of 
arms and ammunition were hidden. KFOR acknowledged the achievement as 
the second most essential and fundamental discovery that has been made in 
Kosovo so far. 
The Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo destroyed more than 4.000 arms of 
several types and caliber, hidden in shelters by paramilitary organizations and 
extremist groups, which were and gathered by KFOR. The arms were 
destroyed by the Hellenic Army, in a furnace of a metallurgy factory. 
The Hellenic Contingent guarded on 24-hour basis the Christian churches 
within its AOR. A crucial fact is the immediate response of a Greek patrol 
team to prevent Saint Uros church from getting burned. This unpleasant event 
took place in Urosevac. All holy relics were saved and were transferred to the 
holy Monastery in Gratsanitsa for secure keeping. 
The Contingent got involved importantly to the transportation, escort and 
delivery of humanitarian aid by "FOCUS" Organization: 160 tons of 
humanitarian aid was delivered to different villages in Kosovo. 
Moreover, the Greek Contingent has contributed to providing medical 
treatment to the local population. The medical staff have examined more than 
2.000 people in Urocevac and Kosovo Polije. 
Following Order No. 152/2001 of the Minister of National Defense, a War 
Cross, First Class, was awarded to the Battle Colors of the 34th Mechanized 
Brigade, the 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the 507th Motorized 
Infantry Battalion. On 30 September 2003, the KFOR Commander awarded 
the 507th Motorized Battalion a Special Honor Distinction. 
The big number of missions conducted without disputes shows the perfect 
organization and professionalism of the staff of the Greek Contingent in 
Kosovo. 
During 2003, following a decision to reorganize KFOR in personnel and 
means, the Hellenic Contingent obtained a rather "light" structure, reducing its 
numbers as follows: 
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• Two (2) Mechanized Infantry Battalions at MNB (N) and MNB (E) under 
French and U.S. command, stationed at Mitrovica and Urosevac, 
respectively. The strength amounted to 700 men with a command at 
regiment level, and one (1) National Support Element. 
• Five (5) helicopters, stationed at Stefanoviki airfield in Volos, Greece, at full 
readiness, to conduct MEDVAC missions and support UNMIK, if required. 
• One C-130 a/c for flight route Elefsis -Skopje-Sarajevo-Elefsis. 
• Manning of the Pristina airport and the allocation of one (1) vehicle. 
• A Traffic Control Company (until early June 2003). 
Twelve (12) Hellenic Army Officers and NCOs (eight Officers and four NCOs) 
serve in KFOR HQs at Kosovo. 
In August 2003, following the new reorganization of the Forces in the Balkans, 
the Hellenic Force was reduced to: 
• 12 cadres to HQ -KFOR Pristina 
• One (1) Mechanized Infantry Battalions of 218 men at MNTF-N based at 
Mitrovica 
• One (1) Mechanized Infantry Battalions of 300 men at MNTF-E based at 
camp "Rigas Fereos" at Urosevac 
• One (1) National Tactical Command of 5 men based at camp "Rigas 
Fereos" 
• One (1) Liaison Mission Team of 6 men at MNTF-E based at camp "Rigas 
Fereos" 
During the visit of the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff to 
Armenia, on 3rd September 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding was 
signed, regarding the allocation of an Armenian Rifle Platoon under the 
Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo. NATO approved the involvement of the 
Armenian Platoon in KFOR, under Hellenic command, on 26th November 
2003. After a decision of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, and 
with the approval of the Armenian Government, the Platoon is replaced by 
another one every six months. 
PRESENT PARTICIPATION OF HELLENIC FORCES 
From 31st January 2010 the Hellenic Force in Kosovo is as follows: 
• One (1) National Tactical Command and the National Support Element 
(NSE) 
• One (1) mechanized Infantry Battalion at MNBG North 
• One (1) mechanized Infantry Battalion at MNBG East. 
• Four (4) liaison monitoring teams 
• One C-130 a/c twice a month for flight rout Elefsis -Naples-Sarajevo-
Pristine. 
• 12 cadres to HQ -KFOR Pristine and NIC 
• 6 cadres to HQ - MNBG North 
• One (1)  Armenian Rifle Platoon of 35 men 
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• One (1) General Transportation Company to transport strategic and 
operational reserves to Kosovo, if required. The above Company is 
stationed in Communication Zone South, Thessaloniki.77 
Bosnia - Herzegovina - Operation "ALTHEA" 
 
The Istanbul Summit, held on 28-29 June 2004, decided upon the end of 
operation Stabilization Force (SFOR). However, the UN Security Council, by 
resolution 1551 on 9 July 2004, asked for the continuation of the mission by 
the European Union. The EU, following the successful deployment of the 
mission Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, decided, 
as a NATO successor, to organize a bigger military mission, this time in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
On 12 July 2004, the EU in the wider context of the European Security and 
Defense Policy decided the conduct of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
under the Code Name “ALTHEA”. The operation will be deployed according to 
the agreements provided for by “BERLIN PLUS” between NATO and the EU. 
The operation was launched on 2 December 2004 and its duration has yet to 
be determined. 
On 12 July 2007, the Greek Forces stationed to the Multinational task Force – 
North (MNTF-N), situated in TOUZLA. Bosnia-Herzegovina terminated its 
operation successfully and the Hellenic Armed Forces returned to Greece. 
After  the Operation  had entered  the next Phase ( Step -1, on  28 February 2007), 
Greece was authorized by EUFOR  and the other MNTF-N participating countries to 
negotiate and sign the relevant MOU with the Bosnian  Government on delivering the 
Camp Eagle Base (where a multinational force was allocated ) to the Bosnian 
Ministry of Defense. 
On 27 June 2007, the Base was handed over. The ceremony took place 
under the presence of the Commander of the B' Hellenic Army Corps, as a 
representative of Greece and the EUFOR Commander, as well as the 
presence of the MOD of Bosnia Herzegovina, Selmo Cikotic,   who cordially 
expressed his thanks Greece for the successful command of the 
peacekeeping operation by the Multinational Task Force North. He 
emphasized that the Hellenic Command gained the trust and the gratefulness 
by the government and the local population for achieving their objectives.78 
 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) - NHQ SKOPJE 
 
In April 2002, in the context of NATO Force Review in Balkans, a new NATO 
Headquarters was created in Skopje, apart from the two existing 
Headquarters in FYROM, the KFOR Rear Headquarters and the Brigade of 
“AMBER FOX” Operation. NHQ, under the supervision of the Senior Military 
Representative (SMR), is subordinated directly to the CINCOUTH and has the 
                                                          
77 http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3985-the-participation-of-the-hellenic-
armed-forces-in-kfor.html 
78 http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3984-bosnia-herzegovina-operation-
althea.html 
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following tasks: Following an order issued by CINCSOUTH, NATO 
Headquarters in Skopje provides support to the Observers of the National 
Organizations with the purpose to contribute to the stability of the country and 
the region, by acting specific missions, as follows: 
• Command over all NATO as well as NATO subordinate forces within 
FYROM.  Investigation of all reports referring to violations of the truce. 
• Support KFOR and ensure communication lines in the country, including 
coordination of the activities of National Support Elements. Investigation of 
all reports referring to violations of the truce. 
• Facilitate the exchange and release of information, aiming at the support 
and military cooperation with the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the 
Ministry of the Interior and other Governmental Authorities that would be 
authorized by NATO to investigate reports for violation of the truce. 
• Cooperation with other International Organizations investigating violations 
of the truce. 
• Acting as liaison to Governmental Authorities, in cooperation with the 
Ambassador of NATO to FYROM, on a case by case basis.79 
Other ongoing Activities 
Operation "ENDURING FREEDOM" 
 
GREEK PARTICIPATION 
On the 14th of March 2002, Frigate “PSARA” was the first frigate to be 
deployed in the Persian Gulf for about a 3 month period and being replaced 
by Frigates “SPETSES”, “ADRIAS”, “HYDRA”, “KOUNDOURIOTIS”, 
“NAVARINON” which all being replaced in turn and eventually returned to 
base on the 1st of September. The conducted missions included: 
• Maritime Interception Operations 
• Assisting supply units and aircraft carriers 
• Sea lines of Communication Control and Protection Operations 
• Search and Rescue Operations 
In the context of the Operations, the following forces, means and facilities 
have been allocated: 
• Souda Naval Dockyard,  activated as a Forward Logistic Site (FLS) with 
increased measures of anti-air defense 
• Souda Airfield has been allocated to support allied aircraft 
• Special security measures for the military facilities used by NATO or U.S. 
forces have been applied. 
• Athens Naval  Hospital, with full hospital treatment, if required 
• Additionally, 1 Naval Officer has been assigned to HQ U.SCENTCOM at 
Taba, Florida, USA.80 
                                                          
79 http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3986-former-yugoslav-republic-of-
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Operation "UNIFIL" 
 
GREEK PARTICIPATION 
During the period between 18 September and 15 October 2006, an Interim 
Naval Force was deployed under the supervision of the Italian Navy (Initial 
Maritime Task Force 425).  The Hellenic Navy got involved with a frigate from 
the very beginning of the creation of the mission. Later on, except for the 
frigate, dating from 20 April 2007, a torpedo boat was provided for the 
reinforcement of the Maritime Task Force. On 20 December 2008, 
Greece removed the frigate from the mission and currently is participating with 
a Guided Missile Fast Patrol Boat or a Gunboat.81 
Hellenic Contribution to the Reconstruction of Afghanistan 
 
GREEK PARTICIPATION 
the Hellenic Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defense 
(KYSEA), on January 15, 2002, with its decision no.3/2002, authorized the 
establishment of the Hellenic Forces in Afghanistan, particularly in the KABUL 
area and the surroundings, in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, dated 5 
December 2001 and based on the UN Security Council Resolution no.1510 
(non-deployment of the Hellenic troops outside the city of Kabul constitutes a 
national restriction). 
Starting on 19th February 2002, the following forces were deployed: 
• A Hellenic Army Engineers Company for Peacekeeping missions 
• Support and security echelons 
• National Support Element-NSE (in Karachi, Pakistan), and a 
• Small number of staff officers, in liaison role, at various ISAF headquarters 
• two (2) C-130s in airlift/ transport role (in Karachi, Pakistan) 
The total force of the Hellenic participation amounted to 175 men. The 
duration of the Hellenic sojourn was initially determined to three (3) months, 
i.e. until 30th April 2002. Consequently, the Defense Council (SAM) gradually 
decided to extend the period until today.82 
EU Operation "ATALANTA" 
 
GREEK PARTICIPATION 
 
Greece took on the command of the Force for the 1st quarter of 2009 and 
handed it over to Spain on April 6th 2009. Our country, having assumed the 
Force Command, contributed to the operation during the A' quarter (Dec 08- 
Apr 09), with the following assets and personnel: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
80 http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3989-operation-enduring-freedom.html 
81 http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3972-operation-unifil.html 
82 http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3987-hellenic-contribution-to-the-
reconstruction-of-afghanistan.html 
 
 
  
48 
 
 
• 1 Frigate with an organic helicopter (Frigate “Psara”) 
• 10 Staff Officers at the Commander's Staff 
• 3 Staff Officers at the operational headquarters in the UK 
• 9 Staff Officers at the Logistics base83 
4.5 Concluded Activities 
GEORGIA   (UNOMIG) 
Dispute in Abkhazia84, which is situated in a crucial strategic place in the 
Black Sea (in the North-west region of the Republic of Georgia), started with 
social turmoil and attempts of the local government to separate Abkhazia from 
the Republic of Georgia; the situation was developed in an armed conflict and 
serious incidents took place in the summer of 1992, when the Government of 
Georgia deployed 2.000 men to Abkhazia to restore order. The dispute was 
destructive, with 200 dead people and hundreds wounded. The Abkhazian’s 
local authorities were removed from the capital, Sukhumi, to Gudauta City. 
Since the 5th of September 1994, Greece has allocated five (5) cadres (two 
(2) from the Army, two (2) from the Navy and one (1) from the Air Force) to 
the Mission. After  a U.N. request that was approved by the Greek MOD, a 
Transportation contingent was created in order to support the mission, 
including 15 cadres, one (1) command vehicle and five (5) general purpose 
vehicles. This team will be sent to Georgia, whenever is needed, following a 
U.N. mandate 
FORMER   YUGOSLAVIA - ECMM – EUMM 
On July of 1991, after a joint announcement by E.U. and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, was approved the creation of a European Community 
Monitoring Mission (ECMM). The main objective of the operation was to 
oversee the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and other 
                                                          
83 http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3971-eu-operation-atalanta.html 
84 Simmering ethnic tensions between the Abkhaz—the region's "titular ethnicity"—and Georgians—the 
largest single ethnic group at that time—culminated in the 1992–1993 War in Abkhazia which resulted in 
Georgia's loss of control of most of Abkhazia, the de facto independence of Abkhazia, and the ethnic 
cleansing of Georgians from Abkhazia.  
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arrangements that have been signed between warring parties and the E.U. 
The mission operated as a neutral mediator aiming to resolve problems. 
At the present time, after forces reduction, Greece participates with fifteen 
(15) cadres, allocated to the Committee (Six (6) from the Army, five (5) from 
the Navy and three (3) from the Air Force). 
EVACUATION OF 240 FOREIGN DIGNITARIES FROM ALBANIA 
OPERATION “KOSMAS” (15 March 1997) 
The crisis that broke out in Albania, in early March of 1997, following the 
collapse of the banking system, spread quickly. Albanians raised against the 
Government and the State, arms depots were broken into and people stole 
arms. Armed groups started to plunder and people were too scared to go out. 
From early March 1997, the situation was escalated and developed to 
extremely hazardous for all foreigners living in Albania and many foreign 
embassies started closing down. The U.S. Marines conducted an evacuation 
mission that lasted three days. Many American and European citizens were 
evacuated from Tirana. On the 14th of March, 52 Greek citizens, together with 
the staff of the Greek Embassy, 5 Belgians and a number of Jordanians and 
Palestinians were removed by the Greek Navy. In the beginning of March, 
fear spread throughout the country and there were talks that extremists would 
burn the capital of Albania, Tirana. This situation led to a large number of 
people gathering outside the Greek Embassy in Tirana, demanding to be 
evacuated. Requests for evacuation were put forward to the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, specifically by Countries that were not able for distance 
reasons to protect their citizens in Albania. The Hellenic MoFA requested the 
support of the Hellenic MoD, the Ministry of Defense authorized the Hellenic 
National Defense General Staff to organize and conduct an evacuation 
mission. 
The night of the 14th of March 1997, the Hellenic Defense Attaché, his 
counterpart from China, the Ambassador and A’ Secretary of the Embassy of 
Egypt, the Charge’ d’affaires of the Embassy of Iraq and the Ambassador of 
Palestine met in Tirana and agreed on the time and exact number of foreign 
citizens that were to be evacuated from the capital and moved to the port of 
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Duress. The whole operation included the evacuation of 171 Chinese citizens, 
40 Egyptians, 10 Iranian and 20 Jordanians and Palestinians. The Hellenic 
Navy got involved with the Frigate “AIGAION”, the guided missile ship 
“KAVALOUDIS”, the mine sweeper “KLEO”, the torpedo-boat “LELAPS”, and 
a SEAL Team.  
After organized attempts, the Greek vessels and the foreign citizens to be 
evacuated arrived at the port of Durres. The “LELAPS” torpedo-boat 
conducted deceptive man oeuvres near the right dock of the port, while the 
mine sweeper “KAVALOUDIS”, docked the on left platform of the port, already 
ensured by the underwater demolition team. The crowd 4.000 Albanians that 
had gathered at the point was kept back by the Navy SEAL Teams and the 
foreign citizens managed to embark safely followed by the Navy SEAL Team 
and both vessels exited the port. The evacuated citizens were moved to 
frigate “AIGAION”, and the operation concluded, with the ships sailing to 
Corfu during the night.  
The Evacuation of the foreign citizens from Albania was a very risky 
operation, in an anarchic environment with unstable conditions, where human 
life had no value. The Hellenic Navy acted in full coordination and 
cooperation, to achieve the objective. Crucial and vital was the role of the men 
of the Hellenic Underwater Demolition Command, in coordination and support 
with the Greek Defense Attaché in Tirana. 
BOSNIA – HERZEGOVINA   (IFOR-SFOR) (14 December 1995 – 4 December 
2004) 
After the conflict, which was broken out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer 
of 1991, the E.U. and OSCE took the initiative to bring back the peace and 
establish the dialogue in the area. By the 713/25-9-1991 Resolution, the U.N. 
requested of all member-states to impose a “general” arms and military 
supplies embargo against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
In early 1992, UNPROFOR was deployed to Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
to mediate between opposing parties, while UNPREDEP was sent in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The situation in B-H got worsened, 
because of the peace-making plan was not accepted and due to important 
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conflicts and conflict of interest’s crisis were escalated. The U.N. UNPROFOR 
was removed from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
On the 21st of November 1995, in the framework of the Dayton Agreement, 
the final document was signed in Paris in December 1995, and the 
1031UNSC Resolution, the establishment of a NATO Multinational Military 
Force, IFOR (Implementation Force), was approved by NATO. B-H territory 
was within IFOR AOR. The mission labeled with the code name “Joint 
Endeavor”. The Hellenic Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and 
National Defense decided the participation of the Hellenic Armed Forces in 
the abovementioned operation. 
On 18 June 2004, during the Istanbul Summit, NATO decided to conclude 
SFOR operations and launch “ALTHEA’ E.U.-led operations instead. The E.U. 
would assume responsibility from 4 December 2004. Furthermore, the NATO 
HQ was created at Sarajevo. Its manning started in July 2004 and began to 
operate in December 2004. 
PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES: 
Greek contribution:  
• One Special Transport Company of 250 men and 117 vehicles, 
subordinated to the Belgian Transport Battalion, stationed at Visoko, 
named as the Hellenic Contingent in Bosnia 
• One Frigate and two Mine Sweepers to support "SHARP GUARD" 
operations. 
• One C-130 a/c and 17 men as supporting personnel, stationed at 
Rimini, Italy to assist in transportation of personnel and material for 
IFOR-SFOR 
• Fifteen officers in support of the HQS 
In November 1996, the Hellenic Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and 
National Defense decided to widen the involvement of the Greek Contingent 
in Bosnia and in the Multinational Force, renamed as SFOR (Stabilization 
Force) on 20 of December 1996. The task of the Hellenic Contingent was to 
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deliver and supply materials from the airports and ports in Bosnia for the 
reconstruction of the country. 
It included one Company of 280 men (with staff from Greece, Belgium, 
Luxemburg and Austria), situated at camp in “Vissoko”, 28 km north-west of 
Sarajevo. The Transportation Battalion was called “BELUGA”, according to 
the initials of the countries composing it (Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, and 
Austria). In April 1997, Belgium, which had the leading role of the camp, 
withdrew from BELUGA and the Hellenic Contingent took over the leadership 
of the Force. 
On the 28th of June 1998, a Bulgarian platoon of 26 men became a part the 
Hellenic Force. After the withdrawal of Luxemburg, the International Force 
was named HELBA, (HELLAS-BULGARIA-AUSTRIA) until early 2003, 
despite the withdrawal of the Austrian Transport Battalion on the 14th of 
December 2000, and the Bulgarian Platoon, on the 14th of January 2001. The 
Hellenic Contingent was repatriated in early 2003. The Hellenic Contingent in 
Bosnia conducted more than 2000 operations successfully, covering 
19.000.000 km under bad weather conditions and on poor and rough road-
network. 
A noteworthy action of the Hellenic Contingent in Bosnia is the cooperation 
with the Greek Embassy in Sarajevo, as well as the Organization “Doctors of 
the World”. Twenty-two handicapped children from different areas in B-H and 
Serbia were gathered and transferred to Greece for 15 days; the children 
were victims of exposed minefields during the war. The successful 
deployment of the operations demonstrated the high-degree of 
professionalism which characterizes the Hellenic Force staff. Transportation 
flexibility was vital for the logistic System of the Multinational Force. 
In the framework of SFOR, the Hellenic Contingent was moved into 
Transportation Company, with one (1) Medical Platoon and one (1) National 
Support Element, the total strength amounting to 100 men. Moreover, six (6) 
Greek Officers were assigned to SFOR HQs. The Allied Military Intelligence 
Battalion and National Intelligence Cell were subordinated to SFOR. In the 
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former unit, two (2) cadres participated and in the latter, four (4) cadres 
participated from Greece. 
As regards the NATO decision to review its forces in the Balkans, Greece 
participated as leading Nation from February 2003, with one Military Police 
Company of 45-50 men, to the SFOR International Military Police, stationed at 
BUTMIR Camp (Sarajevo). The force was situated there on the 10th of 
January 2003 and the Transportation Company moved to Greece in February 
2003, with material and vehicles being forwarded to the Military Police 
Company. 
NAGORNO - KARABAKH (HLPG) 
In the context of OSCE, the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) HQ has been 
established in Vienna to elaborate methods to de-escalate tension between 
conflicting parties (Armenia and Azerbaijan) in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
as well as conditions under which they could intervene to enforce peace. 
Greece deployed one (1) cadre (Army) assigned to the Operations Branch of 
HLPG. 
OPERATION “ESSENTIAL HARVEST” (22 August – 26 September 2001) 
The preparations for the operation begun on the 22nd of August 2001 and on 
the 27th of August 2001 the mission was fully operational and capable to be 
conducted. It lasted 30 days, with the participation of 4.145 men from NATO 
member-states, under the leadership of U.K. The objective was to disarm the 
ethnic Albanian NLA. 
PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES: 
Greece participated with the 525th Mechanized Infantry Battalion and 
supporting Units, including about 400 men and was called Hellenic Contingent 
in Skopje. It acted between the 24th and 25th of August 2001. The Force was 
situated in Krivolac, in FYROM military camps, which were constructed and 
converted accordingly in order to provide better living conditions to the staff.  
On the 27th of August 2001, the Battalion was ready to assume responsibility, 
especially to receive and forward collected arms to Greece, with the purpose 
be destroyed. The Hellenic Contingent consisted of 180 vehicles and several 
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types of toad trailers. On the 4th of October, started the return of the Hellenic 
Contingent   and terminated on the 7th of October 2001. 
Greece also provided one Greek Officer to the 15-member Team of Advisors 
escorting the NATO Secretary General Special Envoy to FYROM, Peter Feith, 
whose objective was to estimate the situation and suggest a solution. 
Furthermore, ten (10) staff officers were assigned to NCCC PLUS 
headquarters, including the post of KFOR-REAR Deputy Commander. 
The creation of Thessaloniki-Skopje main re-supply axis was provided for by 
the Plan indicated for one more time the significant and strategic value of the 
Hellenic territory and specifically Thessaloniki for concentrating a large 
amount of military forces and conducting missions in the wider area. 
Since the beginning of “ESSENTIAL HARVEST” operation, 15 a/c (4 from 
Italy, 3 from Germany, 6 from U.K., and two from the Netherlands) 
transporting 1972 people, 9 ships (3 from Italy, 4 from U.K., 1 from Germany 
and 1 from the Netherlands) carrying 880 vehicles, 87 containers and 40 
trailers, as well as 2 trains (1 from Hungary and 1 from the Chez Republic) 
passed through the port and airport of Thessaloniki. The road network from 
Thessaloniki to Skopje and vice versa was extensively used, while the 
Hellenic Police provided security and escort services to the convoys. 
The following weapons and means were collected and destroyed in 
Greece: 2 Armored Personnel Carriers, 1 T-55 tank, 17 anti-aircraft launchers, 
161 mortars, 483 heavy and light machine-guns, small A/T rocket launchers, 
3.210 rifles, sub-machine guns and carbines and 2.944 spare parts. All above 
weapons and guns were destroyed in “Chalibourgiki” Steel Industry bringing in 
69.780 kg of steel. The destruction of ammo took place in FYROM. A total of 
397.625 rounds of different caliber were destroyed.     
OPERATION “AMBER   FOX ‘‘(26 September 2001 – 15 December 2002) 
On the 26th of September 2001, NAC authorized SACEUR, General Joseph 
Ralston, activated “Amber Fox” Operation to protect International Observers 
who were committed to supervise the implementation of Peace Plan in 
FYROM. Germany had the leading role in this mission. The number of the 
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Force primarily was about 700, and, if necessary, the Force would be 
reinforced by 300 men, already deployed in the area. The operation would last 
for three (3) months and, if necessary, be extended. On the 15th of December 
2002The operation was finally completed.   
PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES: 
Greece contributed 28 cadres to the mission, as follows: 
• Eight (8) cadres as an augmentation to Headquarter Staff, to cover 
vacancies. 
• Four (4) cadres to the German Brigade Headquarter 
• Three (3) liaison teams. Totally, twelve (12) persons with transportation 
vehicles 
• One (1) ambulance with the required medical and nursing personnel 
and more specifically one (1) doctor, two (2) nurses and one (1) driver 
On the 16th of December 2002, in response to a request made by 
President Traikovski, NAC approved to continue the support of FYROM with a 
new Operation. Acknowledging that Operation “AMBER FOX” could be 
concluded successfully, NAC agreed that there was a request to continue 
international military existence in the country, so that the dangerous of 
destabilization would be minimized.  
OPERATION “CONCORDIA” (31 March 2003 – 15 December 2003) 
On the 17th of March 2003, NAC decided to conclude Operation “Allied 
Harmony” on the 31st of March 2003 and hand over command to the E.U and 
FYROM Authorities fully agreed upon, in view of the important progress 
achieved during operation “Allied Harmony” and previous operation “AMBER 
FOX”, towards restoring stabilization. 
PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES: 
Greece contributed cadres, means and forces to the mission, as follows: 
• Three (3) staff officers to support HQ of the Operation: one of them 
was assigned as Deputy Commander of the Force, one (1) staff officer 
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in the Operational Headquarters in Belgium and another one (1) in the 
Department of the European Union in Naples 
• Three (3) liaison teams of twelve (12) men and six (6) transport 
vehicles, one (1) ambulance vehicle with the required medical and 
nursing personnel ( one (1) doctor, two (2) nurses and one (1) driver).  
• A security platoon for the Headquarters in FYROM, with eighteen (18) 
men and four (4) VBL vehicles. 
• The 424th General Military Field Hospital based in Thessaloniki, for 
medical support. 
• A C-130 transportation a/c to make the route Elefsis - FYROM and vice 
versa. 
• A Helicopter Team composed of five (5) helicopters (one CH-47 and 
four CH-1H), based at Stefanodikio airbase at Volos, Greece, in 
readiness, to conduct air evacuations, if necessary 
 The mission was terminated on the 15th of December 2003, succeeded by 
EUROPOL where Greece provided assistance for air-evacuation in peace 
time and established the 424th General Military Field Hospital in Thessaloniki. 
OPERATION “PROXIMA” (15 December 2003 - 15 December 2005) 
The European Union Police Mission in FYROM launched operation 
PROXIMA, on the 15th of December 2004, as follow-on Mission to the E.U. 
mission CONCORDIA. 
The contribution of the Hellenic Armed Forces to the operation is as follows: 
Undertake MEDEVAC Missions under normal circumstances by allocating the 
necessary means (1HU-1H helicopter stationed at Alexandria, Greece during 
day light, and 1 C-130 aircraft for night operations), with air evacuation 
capability to the 424th General Military Field Hospital in Thessaloniki within 6 
hours, or to the 401st General Military Hospital in Athens, subject to early 
warning. 
Other Concluded Activities 
• HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDED TO THE USA FOLLOWING THE 
"KATRINA " CYCLONE (16-19 Sep 05) 
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• HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDED BY NATO TO PAKISTAN   
FOLLOWING THE EARTHQUAKE ON 8-10-2005 (10 October 2005- 
31 January 2006) 
• GREEK PARTICIPATION IN THE EU-LED OPERATION IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (24 January- 30 November 
2006) 
• KOREA (November 1950 - May 1958) 
• CONGO-UNIKOM (14 March 1961 - 9 November 1961) 
• OPERATION  «NEARHOS» KUWAIT (2 September  1990 – 31  July 
1991) 
• KUWAIT-UNIKOM (13 April 1991 – 6 October 2003) 
• NORTH IRAQ – UNGCI (26 July 1991 – 11 September 2003) 
• SOMALIA – UNITAF (4 March 1993 - 3 March 1994) 
• SOUTH AFRICA (April – May 1994) 
• ETHIOPIA 
• PALESTINE (9 November 1995 - 25 January 1996) 
• CONGO – OPERATION “ARTEMIS” (12 July - 1 September 2003) 
• CHAD - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (EUFOR TCHAD - RCA) 
 
• ERITHREA – ETHIOPIA (UNMEE) 
Conclusions 
More than half a century after the deployment of the first UN field operation in 
1948, the size and scope of UN peacekeeping operations has increased 
rapidly. The UN can provide unique skills and resources to bear on conflicts 
that are ready for resolution, thus contributing to alleviate the pain of people 
damaged by war and helping them in the reconstruction of their post-conflict 
societies. Nevertheless, multidimensional peacekeeping cannot be rolled out 
at will, and there is no “one-size-fits-all” model. To succeed, peacekeeping 
operations must have clear mandates and adequate resources and must be 
tailored to fit the political, regional and other realities of the country or territory 
in question. It is important to mention that they must respond to the desires 
and aspirations of the local population. Only then do multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations work as a truly effective tool as the UN aims to an 
international peace, the goal envisioned at its establishment 73 years ago.85 
                                                          
85Department of Peacekeeping Operations  (2003), Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations, New York, USA 
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Both the EU and NATO seem to be developing into more active in the sectors 
of training and assistance. NATO’s training activities, also elsewhere globally 
will aim to the building up of national armed forces and defense organizations. 
The EU will also continue to conduct this type of training programs, mainly for 
the building up of armies in African countries. Furthermore, hybrid operations 
(mainly security sector reform) and civilian missions to develop capabilities in 
former conflict areas will feature prominently. The possibility of funding civilian 
missions from the EU budget constitutes a crucial factor in this regard. 
Cooperating with international organizations, mainly the UN, and regional 
organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS in order to coordinate 
simultaneous or follow-up operations is becoming more significant to both 
organizations. EU and NATO assistance in the building up of African 
capabilities is becoming essential. Therefore, both organizations will 
increasingly call on member states to make appropriate personnel, knowledge 
and expertise available. The expectation is that the EU and NATO will remain 
indispensable element in the future for crisis management operations, mainly 
in complicated situations for which other organizations are inadequately 
equipped in military terms. The EU and NATO appear to be becoming more 
engaged in the expanding grey zone between external and internal security, 
especially in the context of counterterrorism, anti-piracy and other missions at 
sea.86 
Greece has always actively endorsed and taken part in Peacekeeping 
missions and other similar operations world widely, from Balkans to Africa and 
Asia, reassuring steadily its commitment to the UN and its task on sustaining 
the international peace and security. This obligation to Peacekeeping is 
interpreted via the political and economical help and the existence of Greek 
military forces in cooperation with the civilian policemen, in various 
operations. In addition, in 2000 , Greece following these steps, created 
MPSOTC (Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center)87 
authorized by NATO, certified by UN and in 2008 NMIOTC (NATO Maritime 
Interdiction Operational Training Center) certified by NATO, with the 
purpose to help to the establishment of safer and more secure land and 
maritime environment accordingly. Regardless the varied national and 
international commitments of the Greek Military Forces and Police, Greece is 
                                                          
86 Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee, (2015), Peacekeeping operations in a changing world, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, Netherlands  
87 The Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center (MPSOTC) was established after a 
directive of the Hellenic Ministry of Defense in November 1998. Since 19 May 2000 Greek MPSOTC, 
has formally certificated by NATO as a PfP Training Center, after a successful evaluation which was 
taken place and lasted approximately one year. The primary objective of the Greek PfP TC is to exploit 
the experience being gained from the long lasting participation of Greek Forces in Peacekeeping, by 
providing high standards, realistic and updated training to multinational personnel and to national 
contingents, during their preparation for an operation deployment. MPSOTC’s principal objective is to 
provide academic and field training, to National and Multinational personnel in accordance with the 
most current international accepted standards regarding NATO, UN, EU and OSCE. 
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aiming to make every possible effort in order to boost its support to UN 
Peacekeeping.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
88 Hellenic Republic, Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations (2018), Peace and Security, 
Greece 
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